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On September 1, 1994, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
declared a ceasefire. 
The declaration was potentially one of the most significant 
developments in Irish history since Ireland was partitioned in 
1920. It represented, or at the time it seemed to represent, an 
acknowledgement by the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, that 
Ireland cannot be united by physical force, that the armed struggle 
of the last twenty five years to drive the British out of Northern 
Ireland has not worked, that the strategy of "the Long War," based 
on the premise that if the IRA persisted in its campaign of 
violence long enough, Britain would eventually become war-weary and 
throw in the towel, has failed; in short, that the central dogma of 
Republican theology - that only physical force would bring the 
British to their negotiating knees, which dates back to 1798 has 
been abandoned. 
However, whether the announcement will lead to a peaceful 
settlement of Europe's most enduring civil conflict is another 
matter. 
First, the declaration is as important for what it did not say 
as for what it did say. The IRA's statement studiously avoided the 
use of the word "permanent" with regard to the ceasefire and did 
not renounce the use of violence - both of which were markers put 
down by the British and Irish governments as prerequisites for a 
seat at the negotiating table. A "complete cessation" of violence 
- the terminology used by the IRA - is open-ended. It leaves the 
door open for a return to the use of force sometime in the future, 
if the IRA does not get what it wants at the negotiating table. 
While both governments found ways to finesse the 
interpretations of the various phraseologies drifting in and out of 
the political cyberspace, the British Prime Minister, John Major, 
chose for a time to take a stand on the issue, making it clear that 
nothing less than an unambivalent declaration of a permanent 
ceasefire coupled with a renunciation of violence would open the 
way for negotiations between the British government and the IRA. 
And then came the added precondition. The IRA would have to 
"decommission" its arms. 
The IRA will never be in a position to make such a public 
declaration. When, the IRA, after a protracted period of intense 
and often acrimonious debate, accepts the government's position, 
the government immediately moves the goalposts. The IRA, the 
government insists, must decommission all its arms before it will 
be given a seat at a multilateral negotiating table, an added 
precondition for talks, which, Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, 
equally insists, the IRA cannot agree to. 
A unilateral surrender of its weapons would amount to a humiliating 
defeat for the IRA. It would also rob the organization of the only 
insurance policy it has that the British will negotiate in good 
faith: without the possession of arms, the IRA is just one more 
small political party in Northern Ireland, representing ten per 
cent of the population, and in easy danger of being marginalized, 
as often happens to small parties in similar situations. Nor is 
there any quid pro quo in the offing: no suggestion that a gradual 
decommissioning of arms could be coupled with other issues, such as 
the release of political prisoners or the elimination of provisions 
in the Emergency Powers Act. 
Besides, there are no satisfactory verification procedures that can 
be put in place that will ensure that the IRA would decommission 
all its arms; and even if such sophisticated procedures did exist 
and were under the control of international supervision, there is 
not the slightest possibility of the Unionists ever accepting that 
the IRA would in fact fully decommission its armory. 
(Ironically, the Bri tish Government's success in convincing the 
public during the 1980s that the IRA, thanks to the so-called 
Libyan connection, had huge caches of weapons, including state-of-
the-art missile hardware, stockpiled throughout both parts of 
Ireland, thus ensuring that it could wage war well into the next 
century, has so beguiled Unionists that no verification process~ no 
matter how painstaking its procedures would assuage their ingrained 
belief that the IRA was simply pulling a fast one on the 
government. ) 
The fact is that the decommissioning of arms in a situation of 
conflict is a byproduct of negotiations rather than a precondition 
for negotiations; it is an outcome rather than an enabler of the 
process; it is a consequence of establishing a climate of trust 
rather than a precursor for trust; it is contingent on the 
evolution of an agreed-upon political framework rather than 
something that emerges out of a political vacuum. 
One year after it declared a ceasefire, the IRA had little to 
show for its efforts, giving more credence in the movement to the 
arguments of the hard men, who were only reluctantly persuaded to 
the meri ts of a ceasefire, that the only thing on the Bri tish 
agenda is to smash the IRA. 
The IRA has faced this kind of predicament before when the 
contradictions of deeply-held positions has led to splits in the 
movement between those who believe that the way forward is to join 
the constitutional process, despite its deficiencies and 
disappointments, and those who believe that physical force is the 
only kind of diplomacy the Bri tish understand. For a time, it 
appeared that the former were having their way, but the latter, 
especially in the aftermath of the most recent bombing in 
Manchester, which practically destroyed the center of the city and 
injured over 200 people, are waiting in the wings. 
Second, the IRA did not clarify its position regarding the 
question of consent. Both the British and Irish governments, in 
Article One of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and again in the 
Downing street Declaration of December 1993, acknowledged that the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland will change only when a 
majority of the people there give their free and full consent to 
such a change, and both governments acknowledge that consent ,does 
not exist at the present time. 
In other words, the question of the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland is not up for negotiation, and whatever talks are 
envisioned will not have the issue of how to bring about the unity 
of Ireland on their agenda. 
It is imperative, therefore, that the frame of reference of 
what is and what is not on the negotiating table be made crystal 
clear before negotiations begin. Otherwise, the possibility of 
finding common ground will simply dissipate in a welter of 
accusations and counter-accusations of betrayal, and the ceasefire 
will undoubtedly be among the casualties of the recriminations that 
will follow. 
Third, the republican movement has always adhered to one 
unshakable demand: there would be no ceasefire without a 
declaration of intent by Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland, 
even if the date of withdrawal were some twenty or thirty years 
down the road, and even if the guaran tee was in the form 0 f a 
private understanding. Unionists, in particular, have the right to 
demand that the IRA and the British government supply irrefutable 
proof that no such deal was struck. 
If the past is any guide to the future, the prospects of the 
British convincing the Unionists that no such deal was struck are 
dim at best and next to non-existent at worst. Unfortunately, 
there is little the British can do to allay Unionist distrust; 
indeed, their actions in the past, if anything, make a prima facie 
case for regarding Unionist distrust as being well-founded. And 
this is what will make it so difficult to bring the Unionists to 
the table: They have neither forgotten nor forgiven the British 
for excluding them from the negotiations that led to the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which for the first time gave the 
Irish government a consultative role in the affairs of Northern 
Ireland. Yet, without full Unionist participation in the proqess, 
peace will never be at hand. Moreover, vigorous British efforts to 
reassure Unionists that no deal was broke red behind their backs 
coupled with vigorous Nationalist efforts to boost their position 
by exaggerating what the Catholic community might expect in the 
future will likely result in a plethora of confusing and 
contradictory statements as every side tries to put its own 
particular "spin" on matters. 
On 13 October 1994, Loyalist paramilitaries declared a 
ceasefire. 
On February 9, 1995, the IRA announced the end of its 
ceasefire and, to ensure that all and sundry got the message, it 
detonated a bomb in London, killing two people and seriously 
injuring 43 others. 
On May 30, 1996 the people of Northern Ireland went to the 
polls to elect a deliberative assembly that consisted of ninety 
members elected on a party list system, and twenty members 
appointed, two to each of the ten parties that topped the poll. 
The people of Northern Ireland, perhaps innured by the 
experience of almost thirty years of political wrangling and the 
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repeated failure of efforts to secure peace, did not turn out in 
droves to elect ths body that would select the negotiating teams to 
represent them in all-party talks. 
Only 65 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls, hardly 
a turn-out that reflected the people's belief that some sort of 
settlement was in the offing. After all, the IRA had declared in 
harsh language that that there would be no decommissioning of arms, 
questions of a cease fire aside, until a a final settlement had been 
agreed to; every party had reiterated its unmoveable position; 
every side campaigned in the language of belligerence, not the 
language of conciliation. 
It was an election nationalists (Catholics) had bitterly 
opposed and Unionists ( Protestants) had vigorously lobbied for. 
Ironically, the party that had opposed it the most ( Sinn Fein, the 
political wing of the IRA), gained the most, and the party that had 
pushed for it the most (the Ulster Unionist Party - representative 
of mainstream Protestantism), gained the least. 
As usual, Unionists, more apprehensive than ever about their 
place in the Union, voted their fears. Although the UUP headed the 
ballot with 24 per cent of the vote (30 seats), the DUP secured 19 
per cent of the vote (24 seats), a gap of five per cent between the 
two compared to the gap of 12 per cent that existed after the 1993 
local elections. Indeed, it could be argued that the DUP had been 
given a mandate to stalemate the talks since it had campaigned on 
the platform that it would not talk with Sinn Fein or the Irish 
government until the IRA had disbanded, and Dublin had deleted 
Articles 2 and 3 from its constitution. 
Nationalists voted their hopes. Not holding Sinn Fein 
responsible for the collapse of the IRA's ceasefire that 
responsibility they laid squarely on the shoulders of the British 
-and responsive to Sinn Fein's appeal for a mandate that would 
ensure its being seated at the negotiating table, even if the IRA 
had not declared a new ceasefire, they gave Sinn Fein the mandate 
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it sought - 15 per cent of the vote (17 seats) compared to the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party's 21 per cent of the vote (21 
seats). In other words, Sinn Fein secured 43 per cent of the 
Catholic vote - its best showing ever since it had begun to contest 
elections in Northern Ireland in 1982. 
And, so, in the narrow sense of things, both Sinn Fein and the 
DUP, the more extreme representatives of their respective 
traditions made ground. But the elections were not about what 
people might settle for in the way of an accommodation; the 
elections, like all elections in Northern Ireland, were about the 
different ways in which tribal beliefs express themselves. There 
was not one election but two; the real rivalries are not between 
the two traditions but within them. 
Tribal differences are not rival i.e. they do not compete with 
each other; political competition is intra-tribe. Tribal 
differences complement each other. They provide cohesion for the 
tribe and generate the political configurations that become intra-
tribal rivalries. Once there is a common enemy, all kinds of 
political rivalries are possible within the tribe. Take away the 
enemy and you destroy the cohesion that permit intra rivalries to 
flourish. 
Hence, anything that might destabilize the status-quo is 
threatening. The certainty of unsecurely-held positions is always 
preferable to the uncertainty. Uncertainty increases anxiety; 
anxiety means retreat to old, securely-held positions. 
Holding on to securely-held positions minimizes the anxiety that 
possible change engenders. The psychology that sets the parameters 
of conflict is not the psychology of how to manage conflict, but 
the psychology of how to minimize the anxieties that underlie the 
possibility of change, and what change entails. In Northern 
Ireland, the overwhelming imperatives to minimize communal 
anxieties have always been overarching, leading to permanent 
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political paralysis. 
Sinn Fein's vote did not register support for the IRA, but was 
more complex: it was at once a call for a political solution and a 
permanent end to violence as a means of achieving political change, 
and at once a censure of the British government, and in particular 
of what was perceived as its pro-Unionist response to the Mitchell 
commission's report on decommissioning, for the collapse of the IRA 
ceasefire. In particular, it was Irish nationalists response to 
the Sinn Fein platform: a vote for Sinn Fein would be a vote for 
peace i.e. for the restoration of the ceasefire, thus guaranteeing 
Sinn Fein a place at the negotiating table. 
In particular, the increas in the vote for Sinn Fein was a 
reflection of what it ran on : A vote for Sinn Fein was a vote for 
peace. a vote for another ceasefire, for a negotiated settlement. 
Other parties that were ei ther elected to the forum, or 
qualified under the top ten formula were: the ~liance Party (7 
per cent of the vote, 7 seats); the United Kingdom Unionist Party 
(4 per cent of the vote, 3 seats); the Progressive Unionist Party 
(3 per cent of the vote, 2 seats); the Unionist Democratic Party (2 
per cent of the vote, 2 seats); the Northern Ireland Women's 
Calition (1 per cent, 2 seats); and Labour (1 percent, 2 seats). 
The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Unionist 
Democratic Party (UDP) , despi te their rather meagre vote, are 
disportionately important because they are the spokespersons for 
the Protestant paramilitary organizations, which have the capacity 
to unleash an escalating sectarian that could bring all of 
Ireland to civil war. ( It doesn't take much if you put the right 
demons in the right bottles) . 
The results of the election ensured that talks would begin in 
an ambience of polarization rather than one in which the need for 
accommodation would guide the proceedings. And true to the spirit 
of distrust that permeated the run-up to the election, indeed, that 
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has permeated the entire history of the Northern Ireland state, on 
June 10, when the talks were finally supposed to get under way, the 
Unionist parties put aside their mutual suspicions of each other, 
and joined forces to block the appointment of Senator George 
Mitchell, former Majority Leader in the United States Senate, 
President Clinton's special envoy to Norther Ireland, and former 
chairperson of the international commission that had examined the 
question of how the cecommissioning of arms might proceed, as 
chairperson of the forum's plenary sessions. 
They charged that his Catholic Irish /American background 
even though he was raised in a Lebanese family and as a Maronite 
not Roman Catholic) and his advocacy of parallel decommissioning 
and talks as the way to proceed on the decommissioning ~ssue 
reflected a bias on his part toward Sinn Fein. Hence, Unionists 
argued, he would set a Sinn Fein agenda - even though Sinn Fein had 
been barred from taking part in the talks because the IRA had not 
declared a new ceasefire. After two days of almost around- the 
clock haggling, Mitchell was seated, but with the understanding 
that there would be a review of his powers and a more precise 
defini tion of his role . Paisley, however, was not mollified. 
Calling Mitchell "a crony of Gerry Adams," he vowed not to attend 
plenary sessions headed by Mitchell. 
No matter what scenario one envisaged, there was no way all 
parties would participate in the opening sessions of the 
negotiating forum, and no" telling how long it might take to to 
bring about a situation of full inclusiveness. 
In the absence of the IRA having called a new ceasefire, 
(indeed, the IRA went out of its way to reemphas i ze that no 
cease fire was in the offing and that no decommissioning would take 
place prior to a final agreement), Sinn Fein was not permitted to 
participate in the forum's opening sessions. On this question, the 
two governments were absolutely adamant: no ceasefire, no 
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invitation to negotiations. On the other hand, the IRA were equally 
adamant: no invitation to negotiations, no ceasefire. 
In the end, what Sinn Fein had so vociferously fought for - an 
all-party negotiating table, it achieved; yet were denied access on 
the simple principle that if, the IRA would not declare a 
ceasefire, one side in an intra-communal conflict would bring a gun 
to the table and essentially say that, yes, we will negotiate, but 
if we don't get our way, we reserve the right to go back to the use 
of violence to get our way ), Sinn Fein's arguments that its 
performance in the forum elections for the deliberative forum, a 
performance that confounded even the most optimistic of Sinn Fein's 
election strategists, cut no ice in Dublin and London. (And cuts 
Ii ttle ice with few people, North or South; see poll respl ts 
ci ted) . 
But without Sinn Fein's participation, there can be no lasting 
settlement: talks without its being intimately involved will lead 
nowhere. There is no disagreement about this; its simply a 
statement of the obvious. 
If perchance, Sinn Fein's arguments did cut ice - and a good 
case can be made why they should, with some very stringent provisos 
- and both governments capitulated to Sinn Fein's demand to be 
seated, neither the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) - the mainstream 
Unionist party), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - the hardline 
Unionist party) , the Alliance party (the pro--Union 
Catholic/Protestant party) would participate, while the SDLP (the 
party representing the majority of Catholics would, in all 
probability, follow suit. In short, no talks whatsoever. End of 
peace process. 
Indeed, in a concession to Sinn Fein, the British government 
is no longer insisting on the IRA decommissioning even some of its 
arms as a condition for Sinn Fein's inclusion in talks. (Something 
it had been insisting on before the ceasefire collapsed in 
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door had been opened, the space provided for further dialogue, and 
the Hume/Adams connection continued, one of the key relationships 
that was instrumental in bringing about the IRA's ceasefire in 
1994. 
But, as has always been the case in Northern Ireland, anything 
that brings the competing elements of nationalism together, deepens 
the divisions between Unionism and nationalism. 
Thus, Unionists saw the talks between Sinn Fein and the SDLP 
as a rapproachment between the two parties, as a vindication of 
what they had always thought: that the two were in collusion; that 
the differences between them were differences about orchestration, 
that the music itself was not an issue. 
In this sense, little has changed. The miasma of suspicion 
that poisons every political initiative remains as pervasive as 
ever. Nothing diminishes the suspicion, and in the long-run, an 
understanding of what are not only the roots of, but the seemingly 
permanent "I-told-you-so" dispositions that guide the actions of 
both communities is a precursor for any lasting accommodation. 
1n South Africa, for example, blacks and whites did not 
distrust each other. Theirs were far more raw emotions. Whi tes 
hated or despised or feared blacks, and blacks hated the white-
imposed system that oppressed them and feared the white-man's power 
over their lives. Raw and tough emotions can be dealt with, once 
they are acknowledged. Outright hatred lends itself to an 
antidote; lingering dislike does not. 
But the endemic suspicion that permeates the poli tical 
landscape in Northern Ireland is a slippery thing. It has no 
defined boundaries; it is amorphus, shadowy. more powerful in its 
lack of expression than in its expression; more difficult to deal 
with because they it is the product of illusion. 
Will the current peace process result in their coming into 
being a just and lasting peace? I don't think so. But I hope I am 
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wrong. 
The problem, as Richard Rose once so pithily put it, is that 
there is no solution to the problem. An uneasy accommodation of 
sorts, yes, perhaps, but no solution. 
Republicanism is writhing in the agonies of reappraisal. Some 
envisage a new campaign in which the IRA would confine its 
activities to mainland Britain and Loyalist violence would be 
directed against Dublin. On the other hand, a renewal of a military 
campaign in the North would result in a security crackdown and a 
return of Loyalist violence directed at Catholics. According to 
the Irish police, the deepest level of support for an increased IRA 
campaign exists among republicans living in the Republic and in the 
border area of south Armagh and Fermanagh - another case of those 
least likely to feel the affects of violence being the most for it. 
[The Irish Times 5 June 1996]. 
Moreover, Sinn Fein's readiness to sign up to the Mitchell 
principles, which call for a renunciation of the use of violence 
and decommissioning of all weaponry, has caused a great deal of 
dissension, alarm and concern among the republican rank and file. 
As a result, moves, initiated by the Sinn Fein organization in Cork 
- about as far from Belfast as you can get - are under way to 
convene an extraordinary ard fheis (party conference) to discusss 
the decision on Mitchell. [ Ed Moloney, The Sunday Tribune, 9 June 
1996) 
The results of an Irish Times/MRBI pollreleased three days 
before talks were due to starts should also provide Sinn Fein with 
food for thought. They indicated that in the South most of those 
questioned believe that Sinn Fein should not be allowed to 
participate in the talks process wi thout certain preconditions 
being met. Some 38 per cent believe that the IRA should have to 
reinstate the ceasefire; another 17 per cent go further and would 
require the decommissioning of all arms, and a further 22 per cent 
is 
February) . 
Now it is prepared to consider some variation of the Mitchell 
commission's suggestion that the parties should consider talks and 
decommissioning taking place in tandem. 
But this means that even if the IRA were to call a new 
ceasefire, thus enabling Sinn Fein to take its place at the 
negotiating table, the DUP would immediately walk out. 
Without the DUP, given its electoral mandate - 19 per cent of 
the vote, the peace process would stumble, and inevitably grind to 
a halt. 
Nor is the UUP to be left out of the equation of withdrawals. 
While the UUP is now prepared to consider the new decommissioning 
proposals in a more conciliatory light, (its opposition to 
decommissioning to begin only during talks was the springboard that 
resulted in elections), its support is conditional at best, at 
least until it is convinced that the new proposals would work in 
practice and that verifiable procedures can actually be put in 
place. How do you decommission fertilizer, the primary 
ingredient of the bomb that exploded in London on 9 February 1996?) 
That convincing remains to be done. Any decommissioning 
process that does not meet the rigid standards the UUP will insist 
upon will lead the UUP, too, in the direction of the door. 
Both governments were considering a plan under which the parties 
would "take stock" of developments on both the "poli tical" and 
"decommissioning fronts" iIi September - some three months into the 
process. 
Poli tical talks in parallel with discussion of the 
decommissioning issue with the built-in "review period" would 
appear to meet Sinn Fein concerns that the talks process would 
simply not gravi tate endlessl y around decommissioning. Thus, it 
would allow the IRA, before deciding whether to decommission, to 
judge for itself whether the Unionist parties were committed to 
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substantive negotiations. (But here again, there is a Catch 22: the 
IRA says that in the absence of substantive progress indicating 
that Unionists are serious about negotiations, there will be no 
decommissioning; Unionists say that in the absence of substantive 
progress towards decommissioning, there will be no negotiations on 
the core issues). 
But this scenario would require Sinn Fein's involvement in the 
negotiating process, and this, in turn, would require the IRA to 
declare a new ceasefire. And this, in turn, would lead to a DUP 
walk-out. 
And so it will go: political circles to be squared, even 
cubed. 
In the end a ceasefire is inevitable - the alternative,js a 
return to the mayhem and murder of the last thirty years, a 
prospect unthinkable, perhaps at last stark enough in its 
implications to finally concentrate minds. One bomb going off in 
Northern Ireland would shatter Sinn Fein, obliterating not only 
property and people, but the political gains Sinn Fein had accrued 
in the recent elections. 
Indeed, that is already happening. The bombing in Manchester 
on 15 June 1996, and the murder of a policeman in the Republic a 
week earlier, seemed designed to ensure that Sinn Fein would never 
get a place in the multi-party talks that are currently staggering 
on a precarious course. The killing of the policeman, Jerry Mc 
Cabe, shocked Ireland. Some 20,000 people, including the Prime 
Minister John Bruton and the President Mary Robinson attended 
McCabe's funeral. 
If the IRA restarts its military campaign in the North, so, 
too, will the Loyalists paramilitaries, who in the two years 
preceding the cease fires operated with a degree of ruthlessness and 
discipline that had the potential to turn civil conflict into civil 
war. 
Even if the IRA confined its operations to the British 
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mainland, it would only be a matter of time before the Loyalist 
paramilitaries began to retaliate in the South. 
Tony Blair, leader of the Labour Party, is widely seen as 
prime minister in-waiting; the Labour Party seems destined to 
become the next government, unless it finds some unfathomable way 
to lose not to be ruled out, given Labour's penchant for 
imploding at critical electoral moments. 
The party's policy regarding Northern Ireland is one that 
favors Irish unification, but only with the consent of a majority 
of the people of Northern Ireland. For all practical purposes, the 
position is indistinguishable from the position of the Conservative 
Party which continues to favor the Union, but only as long as that 
is the wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The 
Labour Party, however, is subtlety less nationalist-oriented than 
before, and Blair's decision to support Major on the question of 
holding elections in Northern Ireland for a deliberative forum, 
despite the bitter opposition of Irish nationalists, infuriated the 
SDLP, which had grown used to thinking it had the Labour Party in 
its political pocket. 
Undoubtedly, the most significant event of the latter 
part of the 1980s, however, was the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (AlA) in November 1985. The Agreement gives the South a 
consultative role in the affairs of the North and an acknowledgment 
by Britain that Northern Ireland is not the exclusive preserve of 
the British government. For better or worse, the Agreement put 
Anglo-Irish relations in a new context. The new context changed 
things, but whether it can resolve them is a different question, 
one on which the jury is still out. 
In 1988, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, after a series of secret 
meetings between John Hume and Gerry Adams, engaged in an extensive 
dialogue with one another. The dialogue ended inconclusively, 
without any common agreement on a pan-nationalist way forward, and 
with Sinn Fein's support for the IRA as steadfast as ever. But the 
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would require the IRA to conuni t i tsel f to the destruction of 
weaponsinparallel with political progress. Furthermore,only 10 per 
cent question the constitutional status of Northern Ireland's link 
with Britain and only 10 per cent support the idea of a united 
Ireland. 
On the eve of the talks, a poll taken by The Sunday Tribune 
spelled out once again the deep cleaveages amog Catholics and 
Protestants in Northern Ireland. 
On the question of deconunissioning the differences are stark: 
70 per cent of Protestants want it to take place inunediately -
before Sinn Fein should be admitted to talks; only 22 per cent of 
Catholics think it should take place inunediately, while 33 per cent 
think it should take place only when a settlement is reached .. 
Attitudes divide along similar lines with regard to Sinn Fein 
and the IRA: 92 per cent of Protestants believe that Sinn Fein and 
the IRA are one and the same organization, while 47 per cent of 
Catholics believe they are separate organizations. ( Interestingly, 
some 45 per cent of Sinn Fein supporters do not think that they are 
separate organizations) . 
On the issue of Sinn Fein being allowed to participate in 
talks prior to an IRA ceasefire, only 19 per cent of Protestants 
would accept Sinn Fein's admission compared with the 97 per cent of 
Sinn Fein supporters and 84 per cent of SDLP supporters who would 
countenance admission. 
There is a great deal of skepticism regarding the prospects 
for a settlement acceptable to both conununities emerging from the 
talks. Only 24 per cent of Protestants think so; Catholics are more 
optimistic - 36 per cent think a settlement likely. 
Among Protestants, the most widely-favored outcome is for a 
local parliament wi thout any cross-border insti tutions (36 per 
cent); their second most preferred solution is for a powersharing 
parliament with cross-border institutions (21 per cent). On the 
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Catholic side, the most preferred solution is is for a powersharing 
local parliament wi th cross- border insti tutions (43 per cent); 
their second most preferred solution is for a united Ireland (36 
per cent) - only 1 percent of Protestants cited a united Ireland as 
an acceptable outcome. Some 75 per cent of Sinn Fein supporters 
want a united Ireland to emerge from the talks, whereas only 21 per 
cent of SDLP supporters do compared to the 55 per cent who would 
settle for power sharing with cross-border institutions. 
Overall, the outcome that commands the most support is 
powersharing with cross-border institutions (31 per cent) - hardly 
the stuff of consensus politics. 
There is virtually no support for a continuation of Direct 
Rule (5 per cent); and almost as little support for an Indepe~ent 
Northern Ireland (7 per cent) . 
Asked about Articles 2 and3 of the Republic's constitution, 
Protestants want their immediate removal (54 per cent) or their 
removal during talks (37 per cent). Catholics hold diametrically 
opposing views: 20 per cent are prepared to consider the move when 
a settlement is reached; 30 per cent are prepared to agree to their 
removal as part of a settlement; and 24 per cent say that the two 
Articles should never be removed from the South's constitution. 
On the question of a ceasefire, however, there is overwhelming 
unanirni ty - 97 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland want 
another ceasefire, including 84 per cent of Sinn Fein supporters. 
[The Sunday Tribune 9 June 1996] 
But a reinstatement of a ceasefire will not bring lasting 
peace. It is a necessary first step, but in itself not a sufficient 
one. In the end it is the poli ticians the people of Northern 
Ireland have chosen to represent them in negotiations who will have 
to find the courage to make the compromises that will build the 
trust that will lead them, united in purpose, into the uncharted 
political terrains they must traverse before they reach the 
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hollowed ground of a new Ireland. 
1t will be a long and arduous process. No party will get what 
it wants. All will have to settle for a lot less than the demands 
they have promulgated with such intensity for the better part of 
thirty years. 
It will test the mettle of who we are, Catholic and 
Protestant, Nationalist and Unionist, Republican and Loyalist, 
Irish and British - and who we will become. 
COMPONENTS OF THE PROBLEM: 
There are three interconnected relationships: 
BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT WITHIN NORTHERN IRELAND 
BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH AND THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH. 
BETWEEN THE PEOPLES ON THE TWO ISLANDS. 
A comprehensive settlement must take account of all three 
relationships. A second question, however, is which of these 
relationships is the most critical. Most scholars now tend to 
regard the first relationship as the most critical. It involves a 
conflict between two communities with diametrically opposing 
political aspirations. Basically it is a conflict between fewer 
than one million Protestants who want to maintain the union with 
Britain, i.e., who want to remain part of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and just over one-half million 
Catholics who want to become part of an all-Ireland state. 
The first relationship was ostensibly settled in 1920 when the 
Government of Ireland Act set up Northern Ireland as a political 
entity in its own right, and, in 1921 when the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
brought the Irish Free state into being. The political settlements 
of 1920 and 1921 were a failure. The resulting partition of 
Ireland reinforced cultural and political separatism, making the 
development of parallel confessional states inevitable. This, in 
turn, has made the resolution of the other two problems more 
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difficult, perhaps even impossible within existing nation-state 
frameworks. 
Adding to the difficulty is the fact that the Catholic 
community believes that the second relationship, the North/South, 
must be resolved before one can address the relationship between 
the two communities in the North. The Protestant community, on the 
other hand, believes that internal governance structures for 
Northern Ireland must be in place before one can address the 
North/South relationship. 
Historically, Ireland has two political traditions. 
ONE TRADITION IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NON-VIOLENT. 
THE OTHER TRADITION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLENT. 
Historically, proponents of the constitutional proved to be 
uncannily adept at using ei ther the threat or the fact of the 
unconstitutional to gain its own particular ends. 
The quasi-acceptance of the unconstitutional has given Irish 
poli tics its easy toleration of poli tical violence. Impl ici t 
toleration of poli tical violence is also made easier for many 
because "the unconstitutional" prevailed in 1921. 
Historically, Ireland has three cultures: 
A GAELIC-CATHOLIC CULTURE. 
AN ANGLO-PROTESTANT CULTURE. 
A SCOTS-PRESBYTERIAN CULTURE. 
The Presbyterian culture breaks down into two traditions: 
THE TRADITION OF THE "OLD LIGHT." 
THE TRADITION OF THE "NEW LIGHT." 
The "New Light" puts the emphasis on individual freedom, 
religious tolerance, and equal i ty for Catholics, while the "Old 
Light" emphasizes fundamentalism, uncompromising Calvinism, the 
Pope as anti-Christ, the Catholic Church as an abomination. "New 
Light" Presbyterians were drawn to the radical thinking of the 
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French Revolution and to the United Irishmen, and for a time it 
appeared that an alliance between Catholics and Presbyterians might 
prove insurmountable. 
In the nineteenth century the "Old Light" prevailed over the 
"New Light," giving Protestantism in Northern Ireland its 
particular flavor of evangelical fundamentalism. For many the Pope 
continues to be the anti-Christ. As a result of the plantations in 
Ulster in 1607, the Anglo-Protestant and the Scots-Presbyterian 
cultures were confined almost exclusively to Ulster, thus giving 
the province the characteristics that have set it aside from the 
rest of Ireland. The clash of the three cultures and the divergent 
national allegiances they inspire, and the intolerance of each for 
the other, are at the root of the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
Historically, Ireland has had two sets of starting points: 
THE CATHOLIC STARTING POINT IS 1170. 
THE PROTESTANT STARTING POINT IS 1607. 
In 1170, Norman warriors speaking Norman-French crossed from 
England to Ireland with the approval of Henry II and at the 
invi tation of the Irish chief Dermot MacMurrough. Republicans 
point to this as the beginning of 800 years of English rule. 
For the first 400 years, the English tried, with limited 
success, to conquer Ireland but the range of its rule was confined 
to a small area around Dublin with perhaps a thirty-mile radius. 
In the late eighteenth century, King Henry VIII tried more firmly 
to bring Ireland under the control of his Crown, primarily for 
strategic purposes (advances in technology had vastly increased the 
range and capability of long sailing ships, making England more 
vulnerable to attack through Ireland by her continental enemies) . 
Subsequent attempts by his successors to secure the Crown's 
authority resulted in a major uprising led by the Ulster chieftain 
Hugh O'Neill. O'Neill's rebellion t however t collapsed with the 
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defeat of the Irish chiefs at the Battle of Kinsale in 1601. 
Kinsale spelled the end of the old Gaelic order. Within years 
the defeated Gaelic chiefs had fled to the continent in what came 
to be known as the "Flight of the Earls," thus giving 
King James I an opportunity to secure the most rebellious part of 
Ireland by colonizing much of Ulster with English and Scottish 
settlers. 
different. 
The new settlers who began to arrive in 1607 were 
The Scots were Presbyterians of the most strict and 
doctrinaire kind, the English were Episcopal Protestants. Hence 
the Protestant starting point. From the beginning, land and 
religion were inextricably linked, and religion remained the 
barrier to assimilation because the settlements took place i~ the 
context of the Counter-Reformation. 
Moreover, the colonizations were partial. At all times the 
settlers lived in conditions of maximum insecurity. Surrounded on 
all sides by a dispossessed and hostile native population, they 
were always vulnerable to attack. And since the settlements 
themselves were often scattered, the threat to survival was all the 
greater. 
Twice in the course of the seventeenth century, the native 
Irish, in attempts to win back their confiscated lands, aligned 
themselves with a British monarch, and on both occasions they chose 
the losing side in an English civil war. They aligned themselves 
with Charles I in his dispute with Parliament in 1641, and for 
their efforts brought down on themselves the wrath of Oliver 
Cromwell, who arrived in Ireland in 1649, laid to waste the towns 
of Drogheda and Wexford, dispatching the native Irish to the 
impoverished west of Ireland. One third of Irish Catholics 
perished in the eleven-year war, and after Cromwell's settlements 
three-quarters of the land was in the hands of the Protestant 
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minority. 
For Protestants, 1641 had a different significance. They had 
long anticipated an uprising by the native Irish. Actual events 
confirmed their worst fears, and when a number of Protestants were 
slaughtered by vengeful Catholics, it gave rise to the myth of 
massacre, and the myth of massacre reinforced the myth of siege. 
Insecurity and the fear it bred became a permanent part of the 
Protestant mentality. 
First there was the fear of being overrun and massacred by the 
Catholic majority. Then came the fear of what would happen if the 
Act of Union were repealed. Later it was the fear of Home Rule. 
And finally there has always been the fear of being abandoned by 
the British or sold out by their own. Protestant fears are 
endemic. They encapsulate the entire Protestant experience in 
Ulster. They are so deeply-rooted, so pervasive, so impervious to 
the passage of time that it is almost possible to think of them as 
being genetically encoded: a mechanism, like anxiety, necessary 
for the survival of the species. 
The events of 1688, when the native Catholics again rose up to 
support James II, the Catholic monarch who had been deposed from 
his throne by Parliament in favor of his brother-in-law, the 
Protestant King William of Orange, affirmed the lessons of 1641. 
The forces of James with his French and Irish allies were 
decisively crushed by the armies of William at the Battle of the 
Boyne in 1690, and to this day, Protestants celebrate the 
anniversary of the battle with huge, triumphant marches throughout 
Northern Ireland. 
For the better part 
Protestant Ascendancy ruled. 
of the next one hundred years, the 
It legislated the penal laws in 1695, 
laws that were designed to ensure a permanent Protestant hegemony. 
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catholics were banned from public office, the legal professions, 
and the army. They could not vote or own land or teach. The penal 
laws were the apartheid of their day, isolating Catholics in an 
inferior identity, causing the percentage of land owned by 
Catholics to fall steadily to 1S-percent by 1703, and to just 7-
percent by mid-century. 
The eighteenth century was the age of the Protestant nation. 
In the latter part of it, Protestant nationalism began to emerge in 
its own right, which, in the light of subsequent developments, has 
a wry irony to it. At issue was the power of the British 
government to override legislation passed by the Irish Parliament 
(an entirely Protestant body, of course), and the extent to which 
it engaged in this practice to ensure that Britain's mercantile 
interests were always put before Ireland's. The Irish Volunteers, 
founded in 1778 ostensibly to protect Ireland from a possible 
French invasion when British army resources were stretched during 
the war in the American colonies, were in fact an army the 
Ascendancy could deploy to back up its demands for legislative 
independence. 
The threat that Ireland might go the same way as the American 
colonies was enough to persuade the British Parliament to grant 
independence in 1782. The Act of Renunciation of British 
legislative rights in Ireland declared that there would be two 
nations one Irish, one British, each with its independent 
parliament under a joint crown. Two kingdoms, one crown. 
Throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century, secret 
agrarian societies, which tenants used to control the fierce 
competition for land, began to proliferate. Competition for land 
was particularly intense in Ulster, when several of the penal laws 
were repealed and Catholics were allowed to purchase land and hold 
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leases on an equal footing with Protestants. Catholics became more 
attractive tenants to landlords since they were used to a lower 
standard of living and were prepared to pay higher rents. 
Protestants were not. Their secret societies turned their 
attention from Protestant landlords to Catholic tenants. The "have 
littles" fought the "have nots" along strictly sectarian lines. 
The paradigm was set. In the nineteenth century, when the 
rapid influx of new residents, especially Catholics, transformed 
Belfast from a Presbyterian town of some 19,000 at the turn of the 
century to a teeming polyglot of some 400,000 at the century's end, 
competition for jobs took the place of competition for land. The 
sectarian riots that have sporadically ravaged the city have their 
roots in the agrarian violence of the previous century. The 
cleavages of the nineteenth century have been reinforced by the 
events of the twentieth. Even today, the main locations for 
sectarian clashes have remained remarkably unchanged since the 
riots of the nineteenth century. 
In 1 7 91, the Society of the 
largely by Presbyterian Republican 
mandate from the French Revolution 
United Irishmen 
separatists. 
and began to 
was formed, 
It took its 
articulate a 
broad-based form of Irish nationalism that would unite to "end the 
English connection, assert the independence of the country and 
unite the whole people of Ireland." 
Its leader, Theobold Wolfe Tone, attempted to forge an 
alliance with the Defenders, the most effective, well-organized, 
and widespread of the Catholic secret societies, and launch a 
national uprising with the help of the French. The uprising in 
1798 was a dismal failure. Its significance, however, was the 
birth of the Irish republican separatist tradition, the tradition 
of physical force to which the Irish Republican Army (IRA) today 
sees itself as being the legitimate successor. The attempted 
uprising made the British aware of how vulnerable they were to 
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attack launched through Ireland by their continental enemies. (The 
French nearly landed in Cobh, County Cork and actually landed in 
Killalla, County Mayo.) Accordingly, in 1800, the Act of Union, 
abolishing the Irish parliament, was passed. Britain and Ireland 
were united in one kingdom with one parliament. 
The history of the next one hundred and twenty years is the 
history of the attempts to undo the Act of Union, and to give 
Ireland its own parliament. However, the granting of Catholic 
emancipation in 1829, which gave Catholics the right to sit in 
parliament, ensured that repeal of the Act of Union or Home Rule 
(self-rule within a United Kingdom) would have the most deleterious 
effect on the status of Irish Protestants: They would go. from 
being part of a Protestant majority in the United Kingdom 
parliament to being a permanent minority in a Catholic Irish 
parliament. 
Twice in the nineteenth century, in 1886 and 1893, the Liberal 
Prime Minister, William Gladstone, who needed the support of the 
Irish parliamentary party (the Home Rulers) to form his government, 
brought Home Rule Bills for Ireland before Parliament, and on both 
occasions they went down to defeat. Protestant opposition to any 
form of Home Rule was vociferous, widespread, and militant. In 
1912 they formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) , an army of some 
100,000 men who were prepared to resist Britain with the force of 
arms to prevent the implementation of Home Rule. Nearly half a 
million men and women signed the Ulster Covenant, a declaration to 
use "all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present 
conspiracy to set up a Home Rule parliament in Ireland." Liberal 
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith introduced a third Home Rule bill in 
1912 which passed its third reading in January 1913, but its 
implementation was delayed when World War I broke out. It was 
clear, however, that Home Rule for the entire island was not on -
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even nationalist leaders were prepared to grant parts of Ulster at 
least a temporary exemption. 
The nineteenth century was one in which the great mass 
constitutional movements for Emancipation, Repeal of the Union, 
Land Reform, Home Rule flourished. However, a parallel tradition 
of the unconstitutional, which held that only physical force could 
resolve Ireland's problems, also emerged. Uprisings in 1803, 1848, 
and 1867 were all easily put down. None of them enjoyed any kind 
of popular support nor did the majority of the people subscribe to 
what they stood for. However, they fed the myths of unending 
rebellion, of ennobling failure. The failure of the people to 
respond to the message of Republicanism became subverted in time by 
the larger myth of heroic failure in the face of overwhelming 
English superiori ty. And the distinguishing characteristics of 
militant Republicanism began to emerge: elitism (to a chosen few 
fell the task of freeing Ireland; had the men of 1916 waited for an 
apathetic nation to catch up to them, there would have been no War 
of Independence); suspicion of politics and the democratic will; a 
belief in physical force to secure Ireland's independence; a hatred 
of England; and separatism. Moreover, the founding of the secret 
Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in 1858 would have an impact 
beyond its size. When the Irish Volunteers were founded in 1913 
(nationalists were only following in the footsteps of the Unionists 
in forming their own "army"), it was rapidly infiltrated by the 
IRB, and when the Volunteers split in 1914, the IRB's control of 
the smaller Sinn Fein Volunteers became more pronounced. (The 
National Volunteers supported enlisting in the Bri tish army in 
support of World War Ii Sinn Fein Volunteers opposed enlistment.) 
The Easter Rising of 1916 was mythic. Planned in secret by a 
small cabal in the IRS, itself a small cabal in the Sinn Fein 
Volunteers, it was designed to fail, to be a blood sacrifice that 
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would redeem the Irish nation and arouse it to action. Led by 
Patrick Pearse, a group of about 1,400 Volunteers took over the 
General Post Office (GPO) and several other strategically placed 
buildings in Dublin and proclaimed the establishment of a 
provisional Republic on behalf of the Irish people. Ill-prepared, 
ill-equipped, without any apparent plan of action, they were more 
like the occupants of a besieged garrison, ready to resist assault 
rather than representing the vanguard of a national uprising. 
In less than a week of fighting, 220 civilians, 64 volunteers, 
and 134 British soldiers were killed. When Pearse surrendered, the 
Volunteers were jeered and spit upon by the people of Dublin as 
they were led away. But when the fifteen leaders of the uprising, 
including the seven signatories of the Proclamation, were summarily 
executed over a nine-day period between 3 May and 12 May, the 
public mood was transformed. Outrage at the Volunteers turned to 
outrage at the authorities, and those who had been executed became 
martyr-heroes. "Every student of the Uprising, reluctantly or 
otherwise, has reached the conclusion that it was a cardinal event, 
a cardo rerum, a hinge or turning point of fortune, after which all 
recourse to Home Rule on the part of the English government became 
impossible," the historian George Dangerfield writes in The 
Damnable Question. 
"This did not dawn all at once. It appeared first as sympathy 
for the rebels, then as a martyrology; then as a growing 
rej ection of the sober promises of constitutionalism. Had 
Home Rule been accepted by the Tories in 1912, this 
constitutional path would have led in the long run to 
independence without partition ... The great political effect of 
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The public expressed its impatience in a more forceful way in 
the 1918 general election when it gave its overwhelming support to 
Sinn Fein. The party, founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905, had 
become an alternative option, if only by virtue of its existence, 
for all those, radical or conservative, who were disillusioned with 
the National Party (former Home Rulers). The repudiation of the 
National Party, the voice of constitutional nationalism that had 
represented nationalists in the Westminster Parliament in one form 
or another since 1873 for failing to deliver Home Rule, paved the 
way for the War of Independence, spearheaded by the Sinn Fein 
Volunteers, now the Irish Republican Army, under the leadership of 
Michael Collins, between 1919 and 1921. 
In 1920, the British government passed the Government of 
Ireland Act, creating two Irish states within the framework of the 
United Kingdom: a Northern state composed of six counties that 
would ensure a permanent Protestant majority, and a Southern state 
of twenty-six counties. However, this arrangement was superseded 
by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which created the Irish Free 
State, an independent country in its own right, albeit with 
dominion status, with its own parliament, and the Northern Ireland 
state, with its own parliament as well as continued representation 
in the Westminster parliament, which would remain part of the 
United Kingdom. 
The IRA split over the treaty - some wanting to hold out for 
the Republic they had sought, others arguing that the treaty gave 
"the freedom to win the freedom," in Michael Collins's memorable 
phrase, and that the Boundary Commission established by the Treaty 
would redraw the border in such a way as to make Northern Ireland 
economically unviable. A bitter civil war followed in 1922 and 
1923, pitting the Irish Free State army, largely made up of former 
members of the IRA, against their erstwhile comrades, before the 
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"Irregulars" accepted that they could not prevail. 
Most of those on the losing side in the civil war put aside 
their arms, formed the Fianna Fail party in 1926, and entered 
constitutional politics under the leadership of Eamon de Valera. 
A few remained in Sinn Fein and gave their allegiance to what was 
left of the IRA, to the Proclamation of the Republic in 1916, to 
the historically ordained mandate for a united Ireland. 
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, 
For them, 
with its 
Dominion status and the Oath of Allegiance to the Crown, was an 
illegal act, and all subsequent Dublin governments were, therefore, 
illegal. (The Provisional IRA did not abandon this policy until 
the mid-1980s). The IRA, they held, was the true political and 
military heir to the 1918 parliament. They did not accept the 
right of the minority created at the time of the plantation of 
Ulster to secede from the nation. (The Unionists used the same 
reasoning to argue that the Irish Free State did not have the right 
to secede from the Union, that the nationalists were, in fact, the 
real secessionists.) 
When De Valera himself assumed power in Dublin in 1932, he 
proscribed the IRA. During the next thirty years the IRA made 
periodic attempts at mounting bombing campaigns in Britain and 
armed attacks on military and police installations in the North. 
Its most sustained effort was the Border Campaign of 1956-62. The 
movement enjoyed little popular support and was totally surprised 
when Northern Ireland finally erupted in 1968. In The Provisional 
IRA, authors Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie estimate that there 
were perhaps fewer than sixty men in Belfast in 1969 who would have 
regarded themselves as being members of the IRA, and at least half 
of them had lapsed. 
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Irish nationalists - Catholics for the most part - maintain 
that the partition of Ireland in 1920 was contrary to the wishes of 
a great majority of Irish people and that Northern Ireland was an 
artificially created entity, its borders drawn to maximize an area 
that would ensure permanent Protestant hegemony. The Bri tish 
maintain that Home Rule would have resulted in civil war. One 
million Unionists - Protestants for the most part - concentrated in 
the northeast of Ireland, who thought of themselves as being 
British, would have gone from being members of a majority in the UK 
to being a minority in an all-Ireland Catholic state. They had not 
only the intention but the capacity to resist any attempt to impose 
Home Rule. "Home Rule was Rome Rule." Bri tain' s solution 
therefore: Partition Ireland into two separate political unjts, 
one of which with its Protestant majority would remain within the 
UK. 
And thus the irony: Northern Ireland came into being because 
no one wanted it. Protestants did not want it. They sought only 
to preserve the union of Ireland and Britain; Catholics did not 
want it since the new arrangements prevented one-third of Ireland's 
population who were Catholic from expressing their identity. 
Catholics in the North never gave their allegiance to the new 
Northern Ireland state. Instead they proclaimed their allegiance 
to the South. At its most basic level, therefore, the conflict 
pits the fewer than one million Protestants, who believe the 
maintenance of the Union with Great Britain is the only way to 
preserve their future, against the just over one-half million 
Catholics, who believe they will be secure only within some form of 
a united Ireland. 
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE UNIONIST STATE 
30 
· .-
Even though they formed a permanent majori ty in the new 
Northern Ireland state, Protestants felt besieged, from within by 
the recalcitrant Catholic minority and from wi thout by the new 
state to the South that laid claim in its constitution to Northern 
Ireland as part of its national territory. The Unionist government 
established a special paramilitary police force, the "B Specials," 
in 1920 to protect the state against the assaults of Republicans, 
and introduced a Special Powers Act in 1922 that gave the 
government draconian powers to arrest and intern people without due 
process ° The Unionists concentrated all power in their own hands, 
and being a permanent majority they never had to relinquish it or 
share it with Catholics. 
Increasingly, Protestants came to see all Catholics as 
subversives and to interpret all Catholic actions in that light. 
Any compromise with Catholics in anything remotely political - and 
almost everything was was seen as undermining Protestant 
hegemony. The result was widespread discrimination against 
Catholics, especially in housing and jobs; a concentrated effort to 
keep their numbers down by keeping their emigration up; 
stereotyping; gerrymandering with the electoral process at the 
local level; and a society that put the utmost premium on 
geographic divisions and that used religion as a badge of political 
allegiance to the point where one of its prime ministers was to 
assert that "we are a Prot-estant state for a Protestant people." 
Ever since the 1920s, Protestant response to partition has 
been reflexive: Behind every Catholic demand was the attempt to 
destroy the Northern Ireland state. Accordingly, when middle-class 
Catholics organized a civil-rights movement in the late 1960s, 
modelled, in large measure on the civil rights movement in the 
United States, demanding impartial police protection, an end to 





of public housing, and the disbanding of the "B Specials," 
Protestants responded in the way they were conditioned to: with 
violence to thwart the perceived threat since any organized 
Catholic action was thought by many to be an act of subversion to 
bring about a united Ireland. When the police could no longer 
control the situation, the British government deployed British army 
troops on the streets of Northern Ireland in August 1969 to protect 
the Catholic communi ty, and the beleaguered Catholic communi ty 
received them with open arms. 
By 1970, the civil rights movement had achieved its major 
objectives, but the army's presence had become the symbol of old 
hatreds - a symbol that at last provided a renascent IRA with a 
situation to exploit. By mid 1970, the Provisional IRA had fifteen 
hundred members, six hundred of whom were believed to be in 
Belfast. 
In the South, from the 1920s, partition was treated only in 
the context of a continued British occupation of the Six Counties. 
There was no disagreement among the political parties in the South 
on this issue; thus their policies were non-policies, simply 
calling for an end to the British occupation, and hence for an end 
to partition. By insisting that a foreign occupation was the only 
thing precluding unification, the political parties were spared 
having to discuss the question of Northern Ireland, having to 
consider alternative possibilities, having to examine their 
assumptions about Irish nationalism, having to define the nature of 
political consent, having to develop the processes to achieve it, 
and, most important, perhaps, to understand the nature of Unionism 
and the identity of Northern Protestantism. Partition encouraged 
the confessional ethos of the state. The more the Free State 
asserted its independence, the more it asserted its Catholicism; 




ministers to assert that "we are a Catholic nation." 
By the middle of 1972 violence in Northern Ireland was 
escalating at an unprecedented rate. The IRA responded to the 
British government's introduction of internment without trail in 
August 1971 with a military campaign of unparalleled ferocity. In 
the seven months prior to the introduction of internment, eleven 
soldiers and seventeen civilians died. In the five months 
following internment thirty-two British soldiers, five members of 
the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) , and ninety-seven civilians were 
either shot dead or blown to bits. On Bloody Sunday - 30 January 
1972 British army paratroopers shot dead fourteen civilians 
during a civil rights rally in Derry, provoking an even lUore 
murderous response by the IRA in the form of an unrestrained 
all-out bombing campaign. 
The bombing of the Abercon restaurant in downtown Belfast on 
a Saturday afternoon in early March, when it was sure to be crowded 
wi th shoppers, left two dead and nineteen inj ured. Weeks later 
massive car bombs in Lower Donegal Street killed two civilians and 
two policemen, leaving many of the 190 seriously injured or 
handicapped for life. Car bombs and the threat of car bombs 
immobilized Derry and Belfast, stretching the security forces to 
breaking point. 
In April 1972, the British government abolished Northern 
Ireland's parliament and established Direct Rule from Westminster 
under the aegis of a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Like 
so many things that were supposed to be temporary, Direct Rule has 
become a seemingly permanent part of Northern Ireland's political 
landscape, and the history of the last twenty-five years is the 
history of the various attempts to find new structures of 
government acceptable to both communities that would replace Direct 
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Rule. 
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The IRA, perhaps with some sense that it could force the next 
step - British withdrawal - reached for the pinnacle of excess. 
During April and May 1972, sixteen British soldiers were killed. 
In May there were 1,223 shooting incidents and ninety-four 
explosions. And in the first three weeks of June the army's 
casualties - nineteen dead and several dozen injured - were worse 
than in any complete month since its troops were deployed in 
Northern Ireland. 
BRITISH POLICY 
During the late 1960s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s, British 
government policy in the North vacillated between blunt assertions 
that Northern Ireland was part of the UK, and as such the conflict 
there was an internal matter for the UK to resolve, to attempts 
encouraging powersharing between the two communities in the North 
and recognition of an Irish Dimension, to the Anglo-Irish agreement 
of 1985 which explicitly acknowledged that the Irish government had 
legitimate rights and interests in Northern Ireland which would 
have to be accommodated in any settlement, an acknowledgement that 
was reiterated more strongly in the Downing Street Declaration in 
December 1993. Whatever forms of new governance arrangements 
were/are envisaged, Britain has been adamant on one point: the 
consti tutional status of Northern Ireland will not change until 
that is the wish of a majority of the people living there. 
Moreover, all the political parties in the South, and the SDLP, the 
party which represents at least two-thirds of Catholics in the 
North, subscribe to this proviso. 
However, Britain continues to elicit distrust on both sides of 
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the divide, as it seeks to appease two conununities that have 
diametrically opposing aspirations. On the one hand, it seeks to 
convey the impression that Northern Ireland is an integral part of 
the UK; on the other, that it would not stand in the way of some 
form of association with the rest of Ireland. It cannot, of 
course, formulate a policy to acconunodate both ends, and its 
attempts to do so only highlight the underlying incongruities and 
magnify the distrust. 
Having no long-term objectives, or at least not publicly 
stated ones, she is attempting to achieve short-term objectives or 
to develop a set of complementary strategies to deal with 
complementary aspects of the conflict. The result is on~ of 
confusion and contradiction, with both conununities scrutinizing 
every government statement for nuances that might make it appear 
that the government is leaning to its side. The British 
Government's insistence that it is an honest broker and that the 
ingredients of a settlement must be worked out by the two 
communities adds to the recipe for conflict. 
Moreover, claims of neutrality lead the SDLP to argue that the 
task of nationalists is to persuade Britain to become one of the 
persuaders, that is, to convince unionists to become part of some 
form of an all-Ireland state. One could argue, with equal logic, 
that the task of the unionists is also to persuade Britain to 
become one of the persuaders, that is, to convince nationalists 
that their future lies in some form of a Northern Ireland state 
which is part of the United Kingdom. 
Britain mayor may not want Northern Ireland to remain in the 
U.K. It is inconceivable, however, that the U.K., given the 
practices of international law, would unilaterally "rid" itself of 
Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people of 
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the region, more especially so in the post-Cold War world where 
ethnic conflicts and disputes over national territory are resulting 
in violent upheavals across Europe. 
The concept of the consent of a majority is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for a change in Northern Ireland's 
constitutional status. Simple majority consent cannot deliver what 
it promises. It is regressive since it increases uncertainty about 
the future of Northern Ireland. 
Even if Catholics were to emerge as the majority of the 
electorate at some future stage, the consent formula would be 
inoperable without the consent of a sufficiently large numbeF of 
Protestants to forestall a Protestant backlash against forced 
incorporation into an all-Ireland state, in which they would have 
had no say in how that state was shaped (a "unitary state", the New 
Ireland Forum's preferred option, being a non-starter). Moreover, 
Protestants are more determinedly against a united Ireland than 
Catholics are for it. There is little support among Protestants 
for any form of a united Ireland. Most Protestants are not even 
prepared to see it as a future option. On the other hand, there is 
far less complete support among Catholics for a united Ireland than 
imagined. As a long-term objective it receives widespread 
acceptance. However, in only one of the vast number of surveys 
carried out in Northern l;reland did Catholics opt for a united 
Ireland of some form as their preferred option. Usually a united 
Ireland is a less favored option than power sharing with a devolved 
government and an Irish dimension: 
acceptable and the aspirational. 
a differentiaion between the 
Moreover, even supposing a majority for Irish unity did emerge 
and some form of all-Ireland state came into being, what if a 
majority of the Northern Ireland electorate, having experienced 
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life in a unified Ireland with its lower living standards and 
less-developed welfa.£,e system, wanted to reverse its decision? And 
what if the electorate in the Republic, where polls consistently 
show that the South has little wish to acquire a North that will 
put an added squeeze on their already scarce resources, voted 
against incorporating Northern Ireland into an all-Ireland state, 
given the complete restructuring of the Irish polity that would 
require? 
The concept of majority consent is an illusion in the context 
of Northern Ireland's constitutional status. It is not useful as 
a tool on which to build policy. This is in fact recognized by 
both the Social Democratic and Labour Party, which represent~ the 
majority of Northern Catholics, and the Irish Government. SDLP 
leader John Hume: 
Differences should be respected and insti tutions created, 
North and South, which clearly respect our diversity and our 
difference, but which also allow us to work the substantial 
common ground between all of us and through that process of 
working together, as happened in Europe, to break down the 
barriers of prejudice and distrust over a few generations, and 
evolve into a genuine New Ireland where a unity, similar to 
Europe, is based on diversity and born of agreement, and 
mutual respect. The answer they [the Provisional IRA] 
keep giving is that our approach, because we insist on 
agreement, gives a veto to the Unionists. Could they tell us 
how a group of people could unite about anything without 
agreement? (The Irish Times, 25/11/93) 
Said then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and leader of the Fianna 
Fail party Albert Reynolds: 
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The Fianna Fail party is committedO a~ · ;'~~rjof its principal 
aims t~ the eventual establishment of .~ united Ireland, but 
recognizes that realistically it can only come about through 
agreement and consent, and as a result of a lengthy process of 
dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation. (Financial Times, 
23/4/'93) 
The Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Dick Spring, said at the meeting of the Irish Association in the 
Mansion House, Dublin, on 5 March 1993: 
We are working towards an accommodation between the two 
traditions in Ireland, based on the principle that both must 
have satisfactory, secure, and durable poli tical, 
administrative, and symbolic expression and protection. We 
could agree on certain fundamental principles to govern all 
future relationships and entrench them beyond the reach of all 
changes in regard to sovereignty. There are possibilities here 
which far transcend the issue of Articles 2 and 3. [In the 
Irish Constitution, these articles claim Northern Ireland to 
be part of Ireland's national territory.] ( The Irish Times, 
6/3/'93) 
Since June 1974 British opinion has consistently come down on 
the side of British military withdrawal. There has also been a 
consistent consensus for ending the Union. Ulster Protestants may 
see themselves as British; the feeling, however, clearly isn't 
reciprocated by the mainland British. The lack of British concern 
with Northern Ireland is not surprising. It accounts for less than 
3 percent of the UK's population and for just 17 of the 651 Members 
of the House of Commons and since Northern Ireland MPs are not 
members of Britain's Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democratic 
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parties, they never become part of the government structure. The 
conflict in Ireland is seen as being the resul t of "Paddy" 
intransigence and bullheadedness. "Paddy," much to the chagrin of 
Northern Protestants, includes them, too. 
The first White Paper on Northern Ireland's constitutional 
future appeared in March 1973. It proposed a new seventy-eight 
member Assembly for Northern Ireland elected by proportional 
representation. The Assembly would take over the day-to-day 
running of Northern Ireland, al though Westminster would retain 
control over security. The White Paper also advanced the idea of 
power sharing to guarantee minority representation in government. 
Elections for the new Assembly were held in June, 1973 and after 
five months of wrangling, the SDLP, the Unionist Party and the 
Alliance Party agreed to form a power-sharing Executive. Within a 
month the three parties met with the British and Irish governments 
at Sunningdale to work out the political framework in which it 
would operate. The Irish government, for the first time, 
recognized the de jure existence of Northern Ireland when it agreed 
to the stipulation that a change in the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of its 
population. For its part, the British government said it would not 
stand in the way of a united Ireland, if such consent did emerge, 
and the Northern Ireland Executive, under pressure from 
Westminster, agreed to a Council of Ireland (shades of the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920) to give institutional expression 
to the Irish Dimension. 
The arrangements were short-lived. Rather than face down the 
militant Ulster Workers' strike called in May 1974 to protest the 
proposed Council of Ireland, the newly-elected Labour government, 
dependent for its survival on a slender margin stood aside, thus 
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ensuring the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement and the 
experiment in powersharing. 
For the next ten years, "initiatives" were for the most part 
exercises in form. The impasse was simple and complete. On the 
Protestant side, no powersharing and no Irish Dimension. On the 
Catholic side, powersharing and an Irish Dimension. On the British 
side, no propensity to wield "the stick." 
THE DOUBLE MINORITY SYNDROME 
There are two psychological perceptions of siege that collide 
with each other. Catholics use the framework of Northern Ire~and 
as their terms of reference. There they see themselves as a 
minority of one-third or thereabouts of the population. 
Protestants use Ireland as a whole as their terms of reference. 
Here they see themselves as a minority of twenty percent. Hence 
both communities see themselves as the aggrieved party, both see 
themselves as victims, both exhibit the attitudes and passivity 
that are characteristics of victimization, both see themselves in 
zero-sum situations. 
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There are two sets of perspectives: 
THE PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVE IS ESSENTIALLY RELIGIOUS. 
THE CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE IS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL. 
Protestants fear Catholicism and absorption by what they see 
as a Catholic state on their frontier. However, there are distinct 
differences among Protestants regarding the question of allegiance. 
The Anglo-Protestants want above all else to remain part of the 
U.K.; scots-Presbyterians want above all else not to become part of 
an all-Ireland state. 
Many Protestants fear cultural and religious absorption in a 
theocracy. The ne temere decree required the non-Catholic partner 
in a mixed marriage to give a written undertaking to raise the 
children of that marriage as Catholics. This was one of the main 
reasons why the Protestant population of the South fell from 11-
percent in 1921 to less than 2-percent today. They see themselves 
as having disappeared. They are beginning to express the same 
fears in Northern Ireland. They point to the fact that the 
population of Belfast is beginning to become increasingly Catholic. 
In fact, the City Council will be dominated by Sinn Fein in a few 
years. Twenty years ago the population of the Shankill was 76,000; 
today it is 27,000. The Protestant population of North Belfast has 
fallen from 112,000 in 1982 to 56,000 today. Protestants feel they 
are in retreat; they see Catholics as being on the ascendent. 
Catholics want more political power in Northern Ireland, and 
some form of association with the rest of Ireland. 
There are two sets of identity, which often express themselves 
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in terms of conflicting opposites. 
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THE CATHOLIC IDENTITY IS IRISH. 
THE PROTESTANT IDENTITY IS BRITISH. 
Many Protestants, who call themselves Loyalist, have a strong 
anti-English streak; they regard themselves as British only in the 
generalized cultural definition of the term. They are much less 
secure in their political identity, and they compensate for that by 
having a much stronger sense of their religious identity. What 
loyalism represents is opposition to any move to absorb Ulster into 
a united Ireland. Allegiance to Britain is, there fore, 
conditional, and to this extent the term Loyalism is a misnomer. 
The conditional element of the link to Britain accounts in 
part for the ambivalence Northern Ireland Protestants have about 
their identity. Since Protestants are unsure of their Britishness, 
and given the fact that being British is not a primary national 
identity but a supplementary one (no Scot or English or Welsh 
person would immediately identity himself/herself as being 
British), Protestants are a lot more sure of what they are not than 
of what they are. And because they are more unsure than Ulster 
Catholics of what their political identity is, they are more 
insecure about it and tend to compensate by feeling more strongly 
about it. And because they do not have a strong sense of political 
identity, they fall back on their religion for symbols of identity. 
And because they take their cue in religious matters from an 
anti-Catholicism bias that is common to all their denominations 
(there are at least 55 different sects in Northern Ireland), 
anti-Catholicism becomes an expression of a shared identity. 
THE HUNGER STRIKES 1980/1981 
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By the mid 1970s, an explosive issue was coming to a head in 
the Maze/Long Kesh prison. In June 1972, prisoners convicted of 
"political" offenses were treated to what, in their view, amounted 
to prisoner-of-war status: Prisoners were not required to wear 
prison uniforms or to work, they were housed in compounds, and they 
were allowed other privileges. 
But the situation changed in 1976. Under the new policy, 
persons convicted of "political" crimes were treated as ordinary 
criminals. They would have to wear prison disgusting, and 
repulsive. And it didn't work. 
The prisoners decided to force the issue. Hence the f,irst 
hunger strike in October 1980 when seven prisoners vowed to fast to 
their deaths until their demands for special status were met. The 
strike lasted fifty-three days, ending on 18 December when it 
appeared that both sides had agreed to mutually acceptable terms. 
When this proved not to be the case, Bobby Sands began a second 
hunger strike on 1 March 1981. He died sixty-six days later. In 
the following three months, nine others followed in his 
death-steps. 
The hunger strikes allowed the IRA to reestablish itself in 
the heroic mold and to reaffirm its legitimacy in a historical 
contest, making it more difficult to dismiss the IRA as mere 
terrorists representing a few. 
Moreover, the fact that Bobby Sands was elected to the 
Westminster parliament while in jail taught the IRA/Sinn Fein 
valuable lessons: that the mobilization of public opinion around 
a particular issue was a powerful propaganda tool; that the 
contesting of elections provided a base upon which to build an 
endur ing pol i tical organi za tion. Tha t autumn Sinn Fein (the 
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poli tical wing of the IRA) tested the electoral waters when it 
contested province-wide elections for one more National Assembly, 
this one based on the concept of "rolling devolution." 
THE NEW IRELAND FORUM (1983/1984) 
The support for Sinn Fein in the 1982 Assembly elections (they 
received almost one-third of the Catholic vote) made a mockery of 
Dublin's claim that the IRA had no substantial base in Northern 
Ireland. To meet the challenge Sinn Fein's performance posed, the 
four major constitutional Nationalist parties on the island Fianna 
Fail, Fine Gael, and the Labour Party from the South, and the SDLP 
from the North came together in the New Ireland Forum in May 1983 
to hammer out their vision of a New Ireland. Among them these 
parties represented the ninety percent of the Nationalist 
electorate who disassociated themselves from the IRA's campaign of 
violence. The Forum had two goals: a poli tical obj ecti ve to 
contain Sinn Fein and a policy objective to set forth the common 
agenda of Nationalists for achieving a New Ireland that would 
provide a clear and unambiguous alternative to armed struggle. 
After eleven months of deliberations, twenty-eight private 
sessions, thirteen public sessions and fifty-six meetings of the 
four party leaders, the New Ireland Forum issued a report of its 
findings in May 1984. After briefly setting out the origins of the 
problem, the report harshly criticized British policy since 1969 
for being one of "crisis management." The heart of the problem, it 
argued, was Britain's failure to provide the Nationalist population 
of the North with any constructive means of expressing its 
nationalism and its aspirations, thereby undermining constitutional 
poli tics. Having set out what it called a "Framework for a New 
Ireland: Present Realities and Future Requirements," the report 
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addressed the question of options: "The particular structure of 
political unity which the Forum [would wish] to see established is 
a unitary state, achieved by agreement and consent, embracing the 
whole island of Ireland and providing irrevocable guarantees for 
the protection and preservation of both the Unionist and 
Nationalist identities." A new, nondenominational constitution 
would be drawn up "at an all-around constitutional conference 
convened by the British and Irish Governments." 
In addition to the unitary state model, the Forum examined two 
other constitutional proposals: one for a federal/confederal state 
and one for joint authority. Under joint authority, "the London 
and Dublin governments would have equal responsibili ty for, all 
aspects of the government of Northern Ireland," thus according 
"equal validity to the two traditions in Northern Ireland." 
Finally, the Forum said that it remained "open to discuss other 
views which [might] contribute to political development." 
TALKS (1) 1984/1985 
Meanwhile, however, the real dialogue was taking place out of 
public view. In November 1983, Irish Prime Minister Garret 
FitzGerald and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher held their 
second summit meeting at Chequers, the Bri tish Prime Minister's 
country estate. FitzGerald made the argument to Thatcher that 
alienation in the minority Catholic community in Northern Ireland 
had reached such a high level that unless measures were taken to 
alleviate it, there would be serious consequences for 
constitutional politics in Northern Ireland. Specifically, he 
referred to the support that Sinn Fein had elicited in the British 
general election in June 1983 when Sinn Fein received forty-three 
percent of the Nationalist vote in Northern Ireland. He argued 
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that if that vote got any higher, it could signal the end of 
constitutional politics in Northern Ireland, that if this were to 
happen the consequences would spillover into the South and 
possibly destabilize constitutional politics there, and that that, 
in turn, would have serious consequences for Britain. 
Informal talks got under way in March 1984, and formal talks 
began one year later, in March 1985. Despite the lack of success 
of attempted political initiatives throughout the seventies and 
early eighties, the political formula for an agreement was already 
in place. Successive Irish governments accepted that the status of 
Northern Ireland would not change without the consent of a majority 
of the people there, while successive British governments 
acknowledged that an Irish Dimension existed, and that a devolved 
government would have to have the support of the Na tionalist 
community. 
In two crucial respects, however, the capacities of both 
governments, but especially the British government, to translate 
good intentions into political actions were severely circumscribed 
by the entrenched, unmovable positions of their respective clients. 
The Unionists, secure in their constitutional position under 
the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973) and tenacious in their 
belief that their numbers alone precluded them from being coerced 
into any form of devolved government that did not countenance 
majority rule, or any North-South relationship that involved more 
than mere "neighborliness," were in a posi tion to veto every 
proposal. Moreover, since their position on an Irish Dimension was 
absolute, the coupling of devolution that would require their 
making concessions on the sharing of power with the SDLP and an 
Irish Dimension that would involve their making concessions to the 
South made any progress on devolution impossible. 
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On the Nationalist side, the refusal of the SDLP to enter into 
any discussion of devolution without a prior undertaking that an 
Irish Dimension was an issue of at least equal standing gave it, 
too, a veto power that led to paralysis. Accordingly, the British 
government's power to move the political parties in the North in 
the direction of an accommodation was severely curtailed. It was 
a zero-sum game: anything that appeared to be acceptable to 
Unionists was a sufficient reason for its rej ection by 
Nationalists, and conversely, anything that appeared to be 
acceptable to Nationalists was a sufficient reason for its 
rejection by Unionists. 
The Anglo-Irish process, initiated in May 1980 by Irish Prime 
Minister Charles Haughey and Bri tish Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, had resulted in a series of summit meetings in December 
1980, November 1981, and November 1983 between the prime ministers 
of both countries. In November 1981, both governments agreed to 
establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to give 
institutional expression "to the unique character of the 
relationship between the two countries." The Council met on a 
regular basis. Indeed, in one eighteen-month period, November 1983 
to March 1985, it met on no less than thirty occasions. In short, 
the basis was laid for an institutional framework within which the 
Irish and British governments could accommodate their mutual 
interests and debate their often not-inconsiderable differences on 
a whole range of matters, including Northern Ireland. Such 
institutional relationships, it was clear, were not subject to the 
veto powers of the Northern parties. The Anglo-Irish process, 
therefore, was the first step in shifting the framework for a 
political initiative out of the narrow confines of Northern Ireland 
and making it the shared responsibility of the two sovereign 
governments. 
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THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT (AlA) 1985 
The summit held at Hillsborough Castle, County Down, on 15 
November 1985, at which then Bri tish Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and her then Irish counterpart, Garret FitzGerald, affixed 
their signatures to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was, according to 
the communique which followed it, "the third meeting of the 
Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to be held at the level of 
Heads of State." 
The Agreement, which was ratified by Dail Eireann [Irish 
Parliament] on 21 November by 88 votes to 75 by the House of 
Commons on 27 November by 473 to 47, and registered under Art:icle 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations on 20 December, 
effectively gave Dublin a consultative role in how Northern Ireland 
is governed. 
It is succinct, its brevity almost 
craftsmanship that went into its wording. 
concealing the 
First, both governments affirmed that any change in the status 
of Northern Ireland would come about only with the consent of a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland. Both governments 
recognized that at present the Unionist majori ty wished for no 
change in its status. And both governments promised to introduce 
and support in their respective parliaments legislation to secure 
a united Ireland if in the future a majority of the people in 
Northern Ireland were clearly to wish for and formally consent to 
the establishment of a united Ireland. 
Second, the two governments agreed to set up an 
Intergovernmental Conference that would be jointly chaired by the 
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British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, currently Sir 
Patrick Mayhew, and a "Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative," 
at present the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring. The 
functions of the Conference would pertain both to Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, specifically with regard to political 
matters, security arrangements, the administration of justice, and 
the promotion of cross-border cooperation. A provision specifying 
that "determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to 
resolve any differences" a binding legal obligation with precedent 
in international law seemed to suggest that the Irish government's 
role was more than merely consultative. 
Third, both London and Dublin support the idea of a devolved 
government, dealing with a range of matters within Northern 
Ireland, that would command "widespread acceptance throughout the 
community." Should this occur, Dublin would, nevertheless, retain 
a say in certain areas affecting the interests of the Nationalist 
minority (such as security arrangements and human rights). If 
devolution did not come to pass, then Dublin would continue to have 
a say in all matters that affect Nationalists. Finally, after 
three years, the workings of the Conference would be reviewed "to 
see if any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are 
desirable." 
Thus the logic of the Agreement and the ordering of the 
priorities: First, work out the relationship between the two 
governments on a government-to-government basis; develop a set of 
institutional arrangements not susceptible to the shifting vagaries 
of political actions in the North; and then look for an internal 
settlement within Northern Ireland. And thus, since widespread 
Unionist opposition to the Agreement was anticipated, the 
inducement the Agreement provides to encourage Unionists to 
negotiate an acceptable form of devolution with Nationalists. On 
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been subliminal in some ways but very noticeable in other ways, the 
feeling that the Catholic position has finally been recognized, and 
had to be dealt with; the fact that it gave a permanent presence in 
the North of Ireland to the Irish government through the 
Secretariat. 
THE AlA: HOW EFFECTIVE? 
Ultimately, of course, the Hillsborough Agreement should be 
judged on the extent to which it achieves its avowed aims, that is, 
the extent to which it promotes peace and stability in Northern 
Ireland and helps to reconcile the Protestant and Catholic 
communities, with their divergent but legitimate interests and 
traditions. The notion that these aims could be achieved, however, 
was the product of explicit and implicit assumptions on the part of 
both Dublin and London, assumptions that were, perhaps, not 
entirely tenable. 
The explicit assumption was that if the alienation in the 
Catholic community in Northern Ireland, the result most immediately 
of the British government's security policies and its 
administration of the judicial system went beyond a certain point, 
the adverse consequences for constitutional politics on the island 
as a whole would be not only serious but potentially irreversible. 
The implicit assumption was that even if there was initial 
widespread opposition in the Protestant communi ty to whatever 
agreement the two governments came to, it would subside when the 
bene fits of such an agreement, in the form of a lower level of 
violence and the formal international guarantee of the Unionists' 
constitutional position, became apparent to a majority of 
Protestants. In sum, according to the logic that prevailed, the 
existing level of alienation in the Catholic community was such as 
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by the IRA, that the Agreement has facilitated and encouraged the 
IRA. In the early 1990s, Loyalist paramilitaries began to engage 
again in the random assassination of Catholics and the divisions 
between the two communities remain as great as ever. 
TALKS (2) 1991/1992 
In 1991 and again in 1992 the constitutional political 
parties, after years of wrangling over procedure and 
micro-examining the nuances of difference between the suspension of 
the Agreement and merely declaring it to be inactive, the four 
consti tutional parties in the North and the British and Irish 
governments agreed to a formula for conducting talks at three 
different levels (Strand One involving the parties in the North and 
the British government concerning structures for internal 
governance; Strand Two involving parties in the North and the 
British and Irish governments concerning the form and expression of 
the association between the North and the South; Strand Three 
involving the British and Irish governments to give formal 
expression to whatever emerges from Strand One and Strand Two.) 
In this regard, when there is a transparent absence of trust 
on each side of the divide, a negotiating process and practices on 
the basis that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed sets up 
a situation more like a poker 
table than a negotiating table. Rather than encouraging openness 
and risk-taking, it encourages both sides to play their cards close 
to the chest and certainly cannot provide the ambience in which 
accommodation emerges. 
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At each level, negotiation should involve the inherent risk of 
compromise, each compromise is a building block, and as the parties 
grow to trust each other as they move from one compromise to the 
next, with concessions, though difficult, to make apparent on all 
sides, each party becomes invested in the process, each develops a 
stake in seeing the other succeed, the sum of mutual investment 
develops which provides the cushion when it comes to the crunch 
issues. 
One problem, of course, that compounded the difficulties the 
political parties faced was their opposing perceptions as to what 
the negotiating process was all about. The Unionist parties wished 
to negotiate an agreement to replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
that is, with an agreement that would give the Republic of Ireland 
little or no consultative role in Northern Ireland, whereas the 
SDLP wanted to negotiate an agreement that would "transcend in 
importance any agreement ever made", that is, an agreement that 
would give them at least, if not more than, what they had already 
secured in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Hence the impasse, not simply 
a failure of the minds to meet. 
PARTY POSITIONS 
When the talks were suspended in 1992, because of the 
irreconciliable dichotomies on almost every question - easily 
evinced from the preceding outlines of how parties were thinkiing 
at the time - the following appeared to be the positions of the 
constitutional political parties regarding party talks. 
The Alliance Party: In the view of the Alliance Party, the 
public view of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is 
that they want power sharing. But now the SDLP do not see power 
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sharing along the lines of the 1973/74 Sunningdale model as being 
acceptable. The SDLP is taking a more extreme position than it did 
20 years ago. The SDLP is doing exactly what Unionists did for a 
generation: they are driving the opposition into a corner. When 
Unionists went to Dublin they found none of the generosity they had 
been led to expect. 
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): In the view of the DUP, 
the SDLP brought to the table a set of proposals which were so 
outrageous that their own friends (among them The Irish Times) were 
surprised and puzzled. Everyone thought the proposals were an 
opening gambit. But it became clear the SDLP was not prepared to 
negotiate these proposals. On one occasion concessions were made 
on all sides. An agreement was reached on the form an internal 
government should take.But one day later, the SDLP reneged on the 
agreement. Their proposals on the final day of talks were in the 
same shape and form as they were on the first day of talks. 
Dublin made a number of comments before the talks process 
indicating that Unionists would be surprised at the generosity of 
Dublin, but Dublin was implacable on the question of Articles 2 and 
3. They were on the table, but only to be debated. There seemed 
to be no willingness to reform the constitution and it was quite 
clear that there was no business that could be done with them. 
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP): Unionists took Hume at his 
word; they "took the bull by the horns" and went to Dublin. The 
visit to Dublin became an exercise in semantics. Dublin literally 
got stuck on whether there could or would be a referendum on 
Articles 2 and 3, if certain things happened. This issue occupied 
the better part of two days. The paper that the UUP put forward on 
North-South relations was one people thought was a good, fair, and 
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generous paper, and a good basis on which to have an agreement. 
But it was not even considered by the Irish'side or the SDLP.~· 
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): The SDLP had 
strong reservations about the government of Northern Ireland being 
controlled by an Assembly. The likelihood would be that it would 
behave the way local councils behave, in fact, that the Assembly 
would turn out to be a larger version of the Belfast City Council, 
that what you were against would matter, not what you were for. 
That it would be a disaster. Hence the SDLP proposals for a type 
of administration modeled partly on the European model and partly 
on the American model. 
DEMOGRAPHY AND SEGREGATION 
In divided societies, social and pol i tical change do not 
adhere to the narrow contours of parochial party politics. The 
interstices of social and cultural variables have a more lasting 
impact on political developments than the day-to-day megaphone-
diplomacy that passes for political dialogue. 
Foremost among these factors is demography. Three aspects are 
most important in the demographic changes taking place in Northern 
Ireland: (1) the rate of growth of the respective populations; (2) 
the spatial distribution of the populations; and (3) the increasing 
segregation taking place across Northern Ireland, especially in 
Belfast and Derry. Add to this the widening gulf between the two 
communities: increasingly, they live apart. 
About one-half of the province's 1.5 million residents live in 
areas more than 90 percent Protestant or 95 percent Catholic. 
Overall, the 1991 census shows that the Catholic population came to 
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41.4 percent and is most probably rising, while the Protestant 
population is at 54.1 percent and most likely falling. "What is 
all the more disconcerting," Mark Brennock writes in The Irish 
Times, "is the relative speed of the changes. Twenty years ago 
Catholics stood at 34.7 percent. This population has increased by 
seven percent in the last two decades." 
Moreover, recent studies point to a higher number of 
Protestants than Catholics leaving Northern Ireland. Almost forty 
percent of Northern Ireland university students go to colleges in 
Britain. More than two-thirds of them are Protestants. At present 
more than half the students at Queen's University are Cathobics. 
This is probably due to the level of Protestant emigration. 
However, it is also due to the offspring of the previous high 
Catholic birth rates reaching the age at which they can attend 
college. The school population in Belfast is now believed to have 
an equal balance between Catholics and Protestants. West of the 
Bann, Catholics have a majori ty of up to three to one in the 
schools. 
The political effects of the change can be seen most starkly 
in the North's 26 local government areas. Seven had Catholic 
majorities in 1971; 11 had Catholic majorities in 1991, with a 
further two having a Catholic proportion of over forty percent and 
rising. Most dramatically, the Catholic proportion of the Belfast 
population has risen from 31.2 percent in 1971 to 42.5 percent in 
1991. What all this underscores is that in the context of Northern 
Ireland, the concepts of majority and minority are irrelevant. 
The religious divide is also striking in geographical terms. 
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to require new political arrangements in the short run to alleviate 
it, whereas the possible level of alienation in the Protestant 
communi ty was thought to be containable in the long run. This 
latter assumption has proved to be dangerously misleading. 
Unfortunately, even though the new poli tical arrangements 
successfully addressed some Catholic concerns and support for Sinn 
Fein diminished somewhat, or at least levelled off, this did not 
led to a stable political environment conducive to some hardheaded 
peace-bargaining or political stabili ty or a reduced level of 
alienation between Catholics and Protestants. Reforms attributed 
to the Agreement by the SDLP may have weaned Nationalist votes away 
from Sinn Fein, but this had not resulted in a decrease i~ the 
activities of the IRA. There is no necessary relationship between 
the capacity or will of the IRA to commit acts of violence and the 
level of political support for Sinn Fein, a fact the IRA made 
abundantly clear over the last several years when it has carried 
out some of its more wanton acts of violence. 
On the contrary, the IRA was able to step up its campaign of 
violence; in each year since the Agreement went into effect, the 
level of IRA violence has exceeded its pre-Agreement levels. The 
average number of killings per year since 1985 has exceeded 1985 
levels. Until the IRA's announcement of a ceasefire in September 
1994, it was able to strike randomly, ruthlessly, and with little 
regard for life. Each new killing of a member of the Ulster 
Defense Regiment (UDR) , an army regiment recruited only in Northern 
Ireland, it is almost exclusively Protestant and is now part of the 
Royal Irish Regiment (RIC), or the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) , 
the Northern Ireland Police, also predominantly Protestant, has 
only strengthened the conviction of Protestants, who already see 
themselves as the victims of a calculatedly cold-blooded campaign 
of genocide or what they now refer to as ethnic cleansing conducted 
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the one hand, there is the carrot: The more willing Unionists are 
to share power with Nationalists, the smaller the role of the 
Conference, and hence the smaller the role of the South in the 
affairs of the North. And on the other hand, there is the stick: 
The longer Unionists refuse to share power, the larger and more 
long-lasting the role of the South in the affairs of the North. 
In this sense, the Agreement was designed to undermine 
Unionist intransigence. 
In Northern Ireland, Nationalists overwhelmingly supported the 
Agreement and Unionists overwhelmingly rej ected it. With the 
passage of time, however, Nationalist support has eroded since, the 
Agreement has made little difference in the day-to-day lives of 
Catholics and has failed to deliver on some of the more conspicuous 
promises of reform, especially in the area of the administration of 
justice, that were made at the time of its signing while Unionist 
opposition has remained firm. One poll, taken in 1988 shortly 
after the imbroglio over the Stalker/Sampson report and the 
rejection of the appeal of the Birmingham Six, found that only 
sixteen percent of Catholics believed that the Agreement had 
benefited the minority community, while an overwhelming eighty-one 
percent of Catholic respondents could find no benefit to their 
community from it. Protestants, of course, 
Agreement with which they could identify: 
found even less in the 
Eighty-five percent of 
Protestant respondents believed that Protestants had not benefited 
from the Agreement and only a minuscule four percent could point to 
some benefit to their community. 
Nevertheless, despite opinion polls, SDLP leaders insist that 
the Agreement has had a more subtle psychological impact in the 
Catholic community: that the feeling of isolation from the rest of 
the country has decreased; that the impact of the Agreement has 
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Almost every local authority west of the river Bann has a Catholic 
majori ty, as has that area taken as a whole. Currently three 
counties; Derry, Fermanagh, and Tyrone, have Catholic majorities, 
so that there are in fact two minorities in Northern Ireland, one 
east of the Bann and one west of the Bann. Moreover, since 1978 
the number of Catholics born each year has exceeded the number of 
Protestants while seven out of 10 deaths are of Protestants, 
suggesting a younger growing Catholic population and an older, more 
slowly growing Protestant population. 
Twenty years ago, the Protestant population of the Shankill 
was 76,000; today it is 27,000. The Protestant population of North 
Belfast has fallen from 150,000 in 1982 to 67,000 today. 
Protestants see themselves as being in retreat; Catholics as being 
on the ascendent. 
In the last twenty years, of the 566 district council wards, 
the number of predominantly Catholic wards has increased from 43 to 
120; areas almost exclusively Protestant has risen from 56 to 115. 
The so-called Peace Wall that cuts through Belfast slicing streets 
into Catholic and Protestant ghettos is living testimony to the 
depth of the divisions and the manner in which people deal with it. 
Thus, even if the level of violence has fallen over the last 
14 years, the level of polarization and segregation, amounting in 
many cases to de facto apartheid, has not been conducive to 
developing a climate that will bring to fruition the seeds of trust 
and tolerance, and the mutual understanding that are constantly 
emphasized as being the necessary underpinnings of a settlement. 
Government housing policy, is for all practical purposes, one of 
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segregation, motivated, 
But that should not 
in part, by considerations of security. 
obscure the more fundamental cause of 
segregation: most housing segregation is voluntarily chosen by 
members of both communities as a matter of preference and is not 
government imposed. One, result is that as the level of contact 
between Catholic and Protestant has fallen over the last 25 years, 
ignorance, suspicion, and distrust - the bases of prejudice - have 
risen. 
As a result of the geographical dispersion of the population, 
politicians will have to take into account the anatomy of Northern 
Ireland before developing political structures for the whole unit; 
in a restructured Northern Ireland special arrangements will have 
to be made, particularly for policing, on the west side of the 
Bann. 
"Nationalists are winning", that is the perception of the 
Protestant working classes, that, and the belief that if 
nationalists hold to their demands and refuse compromise, they 
will eventually prevail when Britain finds a way out of Ireland and 
abandons Northern Protestants to their own devices. These themes 
recur frequently in Belfast where there is a marked difference 
between the attitudes in both working class communi ties on the 
Falls, the Shankill, and North Belfast. On the Catholic side there 
is a marked preoccupation with the behavior of the security forces, 
the constant harassment of young people, the intimidation, the 
unacceptability of the RUC, the maladministration of justice, the 
marginalization of their political representatives, and 
unemployment and deprivation. 
But while unemployment and deprivation are also one among many 
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concerns in Protestant working class areas, Protestants are 
obsessed with a deeply-felt sense that they are losing, even though 
they often find it difficult to articulate exactly what it is they 
are losing. They believe that they are somehow being pushed out, 
that the concerns of the Protestant working class are ignored, that 
the Protestant working class is being mistreated, that they are 
being made the scapegoat for the actions of the Protestant ruling 
classes in the past. 
Add to the brew Protestant perceptions that they lack 
community leadership, that Catholics are better at community 
development, more skilled at raising funding and getting publicity, 
and the disquiet in Protestant working class areas, the sense of 
being the deprived majority, has disturbing overt ones overt that 
spillover into violence. "An eye for an eye" is increasingly the 
demand, even though it leaves everybody blind. Protestants feel 
they have been giving everything for the last twenty-five years; 
Catholics feel they have not caught up. There is scarcely any 
recognition among Protestants that Catholics are discriminated 
against and have some catching up to do. Protestants in working 
class areas do not accept the claim that Catholics are still more 
than twice as likely to be unemployed and they see the Fair 
Employment Commission (FEC) as a way of "doing Protestants down." 
Central to the sense of anger in Belfast is the feeling 
working class Protestants have of being squeezed out and their 
equation of this sense of being pushed out with the belief that 
Catholics are winning, and that loss of territory is evidence of an 
advancing Catholic community, that their current experiences in 
Northern Ireland are a precursor of what fate awaits them in some 
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future all-Ireland state. 
LOYALIST VIOLENCE 
This is the context 









understood. The new policy: literally, "an eye for an eye" - for 
every murdered Protestant (i.e. member of the security forces), a 
dead Catholic. For the first time, greater numbers of people - all 
of them Catholic- were being killed by the UVF and UFF than the 
number of security personnel, civilians and loyalists being killed 
by the IRA. The fact that these killings were for the most part 
random killings added a more frightening dimension to the conflict; 
proof, as if proof was needed, that in situations of conflict, a 
political vacuum will create the violence needed to fill it. 
There are, in fact, two wars: the class war reflected in the 
data for fatalities for North and West Belfast especially, and the 
Border war, conducted in rural areas along more traditional 
nationalist/Unionist lines. Over forty percent of all deaths have 
occurred in West Belfast or North Belfast. Areas of greatest 
deprivation are also the areas of greatest violence. Forty-five 
percent of Northern Ireland's unemployment and 65 percent of the 
violence are in these areas. There are two divisions, a vertical 
one and a horizontal one. The vertical one is between Catholics 
and Protestants, the horizontal one between haves and have-nots. 
In Northern Ireland, it's when the two intersect that the conflict 
has been the worst. 
Between 1969 and 1989 Loyalist paramilitary organizations 
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were responsible for 691 deaths, or twenty-five percent of the 
total. Usually Loyalist violence has come in cycles and ebbs and 
flows with variations in political circumstance, in recurring 
patterns of tit-for-tat killings. In 1991, Loyalist paramilitary 
organizations were responsible for 42 dead, or nearly 45 per cent 
of fatalities; in 1992 for 35 dead, also nearly 45 per cent of 
fatalities; in 1993 for 49 dead, or 58 per cent of fatalities; and 
in 1994, before the declaration of cease fires, for 35 dead or 60 
per cent of fatalities. These totals are greater than for killings 
by republican paramilitary organizations during the same periods. 
What made this cycle of violence more ominous was the manner 
in which it differed from the violence of the 1970s. It was more 
ruthless, more sophisticated, more efficient, and less open to 
penetration. It was also generationally different. Members of the 
UDA or UVF in the 1970s were there to protect the status quo; in 
many ways they were convinced that they had the implicit support of 
the unionist parties, and were, in some instances, their armed 
surrogates. 
Members were part of the "old Northern Ireland," grew up under 
successive unionist regimes, believed that Northern Ireland was a 
Protestant state for a Protestant people, and even if they did not 
share in Protestant privilege and power, they believed they 
belonged to the superior group and wanted to preserve their 
position. The Protestant working classes were marginally better 
than their Catholic counterparts, if only in the sense that they 
"belonged" to the ruling sectarian communi ty. Even for those 
Protestants who were close to the bottom of the economic heap, it 
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was comforting to know that Catholics as a class were worse off. 
It fed the myth of superiority, ascension, exclusivity. 
All that has changed. It is often forgotten that Northern 
Ireland has been under Direct Rule for 22 years, for almost 
one-third of the life of the Northern Ireland state. Today's 
loyalist paramilitaries are different. Many were born after the 
conflict erupted in 1969 or the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972. 
They have no reference point for Protestant privilege and power, 
never knew Stormont rule. Given the increasing alienation that has 
taken hold in Protestant working-class areas, they see themselves 
as constantly losing, see nationalists as winning, and see their 
relative position continuing to decline. 
And they saw more: that violence pays; the IRA, in their eyes, 
has squeezed concession after concession from the British 
government; that in the end, the only thing that counted was the 






to it, and the 
political parties 
persuaded both 
in Loyalist violence and the IRA's 
seeming paralysis among the Northern 
in the face of a worsening situation 
governments, especially the British 
government, as the sovereign power, to take action. 
If one series of events can be pinpointed as pivotal in 
galvanizing them into action, it was, perhaps, the carnage that 
descended upon Belfast in the last week of October 1993. On 
October 23, an IRA bomb exploded in a crowded food store on the 
Shankill Road, killing nine Protestants, one Catholic, and injuring 
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seriously fifty others. The Protestant paramilitaries promised to 
exact a "terrible revenge." 
They did, killing within days an equal number of Catholics. 
In the wake of these killings, the two governments held a series of 
meetings leading to a Joint Declaration by Irish Prime Minister 
Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister John Major. 
THE JOINT DECLARATION 
The Declaration on the 15 December, 1993 once again set odown 
the conditions that Sinn Fein and the IRA would have to meet in 
order to become part of the ephemeral "peace process." Of foremost 
importance was the stipulation that there had to be a permanent end 
to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. 
For its part, the Irish government acknowledged that it would 
be "wrong to impose a united Ireland in the absence of the freely 
given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland." 
And for its part, the British government reiterated that it had "no 
selfish, strategic or economic interest" in Northern Ireland. 
But the Declaration also contained ambiguous, and even 
seemingly contradictory references regarding the crucial question 
of consent. "It is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement 
between the two parts respectively," it said, "to exercise their 
right to self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and 
concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a uni ted 
Ireland, if that is their wish." 
65 
The decision by the IRA to announce a ceasefire was not one 
that was the product of an enthusiastic turnabout or a new-found 
commitment to non-violence, but one hammered out in the trenches of 
hardball political strategising, one agonizingly reached by old 
comrades imprisoned by unbreachable bonds, haunted by the memories 
of what had happened when the IRA leadership had agreed to a cease 
fire in 1975, a ceasefire that had all but destroyed the movement. 
The fact that those who most passionately argued for a ceasefire in 
1993/' 94 were among those who had most vociferously opposed a 
ceasefire in 1975, and ,indeed, had ousted the previous leadership 
because of its ineptitude in managing that cease fire, added to the 
irony of their deliberations. 
DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE CEASE FIRES 
Meanwhile, the British and Irish governments developed a Joint 
Framework Document, made public on February 22, 1995, that will be 
used as the basis for future negotiations. The framework document 
reinforces the Joint Declaration reiterating once again that no 
change in the constitutional status will take place without the 
consent of the people of Northern Ireland. 
However, there were also many dissimilarities and differences 
between the two governments regarding how negotiations should 
proceed and what criteria should be met before negotiations could 
begin. The fundamental points of contention between the two 
governments remain, as ever, the South's constitutional claims to 
sovereignty over the North, and the future form the North/South 
relationship would take. 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution claim that the entire 
"national territory" of Ireland falls under the jurisdiction of the 
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In many quarters, the Joint Declaration was seen as little 
more than an awkward reworking of the AlA, especially of Article 1 
regarding the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. (" .. . its 
essential balance," said Sir David Goodall, one of the architects 
of the AlA, "is no different from that struck in Article 1 of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement ... ") 
Nevertheless, the Declaration was well received, perhaps 
because it committed British Prime Minister John Major to putting 
Northern Ireland on the British political agenda. 
CEASE FIRES 
Military stalemate, the long hard drain on republican families, 
especially the families of prisoners, hints by the British that 
they would be prepared to consider new initiatives, the absence of 
any sense of progress on the political front, the levelling-off of 
Sinn Fein's capacity to make an electoral breakthrough; indeed, the 
more likely reality of an impending electoral eclipse, the fruits 
of the dialogue the SDLP, under John Hume's direction, initiated 
with Sinn Fein in the late 1980s, the talks that continued between 
Hume and Adams after the official termination of talks between the 
two parties in 1990?, the dialogue within the republican movement 
and between republican leaders like Adams, McGuinness and Mc 
Laughlin and the IRA's Army Council, the consultations with 
prisoners that Sinn Fein and the IRA should begin to explore new 
paradigms culminated in a decision by the Army Council to give the 
politics of a cease fire a chance, but with the clear understanding 
that the advocates of a cease fire would have to prove the efficacy 
of their strategy - a cease fire, yes; but a conditional one. 
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Irish state. This, of course, is in contradiction to the concept 
of majority consent, which successive Irish governments have 
subscribed to for two decades. It was the view of the British 
government that the framework document could not be completed until 
these differences were resolved. 
The second point of difference between the two governments is the 
form and extent of the North/South relationship. The Irish Prime 
Minister Albert Reynolds proposed that a series of North/South 
institutions with executive powers be established to promote 
economic development and cooperation between both parts of Ireland. 
Most Northern Ireland Protestants would be extremely wary of such 
institutional structures, almost certainly to the point of 
rejection, assuming that they were one more step in the direction 
of an all-Ireland state. 
Prime Ministers Major and Reynolds met at Chequers on October 24, 
1994 to discuss the drafting of the framework document. At the 
time, their meeting was not thought to have yielded much agreement 
or understanding. However, on November 4, Reynolds cleared the way 
for further action by explicitly stating that the Irish 
Constitution would be changed to "make it clear in constitutional 
terms for the first time that the Irish people say in unequivocal 
terms that there will be no change in the constitutional position 
of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority." (NY 
Times, November 4, 1994). 
An earlier move by John Major also facilitated talks between the 
two governments. On October 22, 1994, he announced that his 
government would accept the "working assumption" that the IRA cease 
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fire was intended to be permanent and that representatives of the 
government would likely meet with Sinn Fein before Christmas. 
In addition he announced that cross-border roads would be reopened 
in phases; that the exclusion orders forbidding Gerry Adams and 
Martin Mc Guinness from entering mainland Britain had been 
rescinded; and that the British government would publish a series 
of its own proposals for peace in Northern Ireland along with the 
framework document (Irish Times, October 23) . 
Acceptance of the "working assumption," was key to the continuation 
of the negotiating process. Until mid-October, Major's government 
had insisted that Sinn Fein publicly announce its intentions for a 
permanent cease fire. Other items in Major's statement were also 
intended to "appease" nationalists, many of whom were accusing 
Major of taking a "Unionist" position and intentionally delaying 
the negotiating process. 
In the South, a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation was established 
by Reynolds. The terms of reference for the Forum stated that it 
had been established "to consult on and examine ways in which 
lasting peace, stability and reconciliation [could] be established 
by agreement among the people of Ireland, on the steps required to 
remove barriers of distrust, and on the basis of promoting respect 
for the equal rights and validity of both traditions and 
identities." (Irish Times, October 1994) 
On October 29, the first session of the forum was held in Dublin 
Castle. Although the unionists parties were invited to attend, they 
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declined to do so. Representation in the forum was decided by past 
electoral performance. The 38 forum seats were held by Fianna Fail 
(9), Fine Gael (6), the Labour Party (5), the Progressive Democrats 
(2), the Democratic Left (1), the Green Party (1) from the 
Republic; and, the SDLP (5), the Alliance Party (3) and Sinn Fein 
(3) from Northern Ireland. The remaining seat was held by the late 
Gordon Wilson from Northern Ireland. 
Following the first meeting of the forum, it was announced that 
subsequent meetings would be devoted to issues such as: security 
matters and policing; economic development; constitutional issues 
and political structures; North/South cooperation; cooperation 
wi thin Northern Ireland; fundamental rights and freedoms; and, 
obstacles to building trust. 
The Irish government seemed to envisage the forum as a means of 
establishing the North/South executive institutions Reynolds had 
proposed earlier in the Autumn. These institutions would address 
issues such as: internal investment in Ireland; 
agriculture and fishing; the environment; and energy and 




nationalists were to accept the concept of consent, then 
unionists would have to support strong North/South links. 
if 
the 
The unionist reaction to the forum was not unexpected. A letter 
signed by local representatives of the DUP, given to the forum's 
chairperson, Judge Catherine McGuinness, at the opening session, 
alleged that the forum was based on an "illegal claim" to 
jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and that it was an "autonomous 
pan-nationalist front." (Irish Times 10/29). The Ulster Unionist 
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Party (UUP) did not openly denounce the forum, but it refused to 
participate. 
Divisions within the Unionist camp emerged as the peace process 
continued. This is reflected particularly in the differences 
between the two main unionist parties, and also between the DUP and 
the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic 
Party (UDP). The PUP and UDP represent the loyalist paramilitary 
groups. 
The DUP rejected the forum out- of- hand. In an article published 
in the Irish Times Deputy Leader Peter Robinson said that the DUP 
believed that the IRA cease fire would continue only as long as the 
IRA could wring concessions out of the unionists. In order for the 
DUP to enter the negotiating process, the two governments would 
have to give a pledge that a referendum be conducted before any 
negotiations regarding the status of Northern Ireland could begin. 
While the UUP is more centrist, it, too, has stood firm on a number 
of issues, insisting on changes in the Republic's constitution to 
give expression to its position on consent. 
Most important, however, was the unequivocal insistence by both 
parties on the question of the decommissioning of arms. They 
demanded that the IRA hand over its caches of weapons, before they 
would begin to entertain the idea of all-party negotiations. 
In addition to differences between the DUP and UUP, there are also 
differences between the mainstream unionist parties and their 
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counterparts to the right. The PUP and UDP moved quickly to 
support the peace process by claiming credit for bringing about the 
loyalist cease fire. This action irked the mainstream unionist 
parties, especially the DUP, since it indicated that the far-right 
wing of the unionist community was satisfied that the Union was 
under no threat and was comfortable with the British government's 
assurances on the question of consent. Moreover, both the PUP and 
the UDP publicly stated their desire to meet with Sinn Fein as soon 
as Gerry Adams began talks with the Bri tish government. The 
actions of the PUP and UDP were seen by some as embarrassing to the 
UUP and DUP, by making them appear to be slow-moving and reluctant 
to advance the process. 
The DUP immediately issued a statement rejecting the paramilitaries 
, positions and spelling out a number of conditions that would have 
to be met before they would engage in talks, including assurances 
by the British and Irish governments that a referendum would be 
held before any negotiations began and that its results would have 
to be declared binding and permanent. What happened, in effect, is 
that the IRA's announcement of a cease fire caught the mainstream 
unionist parties off-guard, a political vacuum opened, and the far-
right moved quickly to fill it. 
In early November, Reynolds announced a series of legal changes in 
the Republic, including lifting the state of emergency that had 
prevailed in the South since 1939, plans to release a number of 
Northern Ireland prisoners held in the Republic, and the passage of 
legislation to allow the for the repatriation of Irish prisoners 
from British jails. 
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In late November/December 1994, a series of political upheavals in 
the Republic threatened to slow, if not derail, the peace process. 
First, Reynolds was forced to resign as Prime Minister, when the 
Labour party, Fianna Fail's partner in coali tion, wi thdrew its 
support. The Labour Party's action came after it learned that the 
Attorney General's office waited for seven months before acting on 
an extradition warrant for a priest accused of molesting a boy in 
Northern Ireland. Moreover, Reynolds, despite his knowledge of the 
affair proceeded to appoint the Attorney General, Harry Whelehan, 
to the position of president of the High Court. 
Bertie Ahern, the acting Minister of Finance, was elected leader of 
Fianna Fail and entered into negotiations with Labour to form a new 
government. But a series of disclosures in the Irish Times strongly 
suggested that several Fianna Fail ministers may have had knowledge 
of the Whelehan case which had been withheld from the Dail. Labour 
promptly broke off its negotiations with Fianna Fail. 
After much brokering, a new government composed of Fine Gael, 
Labour, and the Democratic Left, the so-called "Rainbow Coalition," 
headed by John Bruton, leader of Fine Gael. Dick Sring retained 
his positions as Tanaiste and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bruton, 
who is well-known for his moderate positions on Northern Ireland, 
especially in regard to Articles 2 and 3, met almost immediately 
after being elected Prime Minister wi th Gerry Adams to dispel 
doubts as to the authenticity of his nationalist credentials. 
DECOMMISSIONING 
Moreover, there is an element of the incredulous to the 
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British government's guarantee of a place in any multi-party 
negotiating forum to Sinn Fein, if only the IRA decommissions its 
arms. The DUP, for example, have made it clear that it has no 
intention of joining Sinn Fein in any multi-lateral negotiating 
process at the moment (June1996) , decommissioning or no 
decommissioning of arms, and the Bri tish government is in no 
position to impose its will in the matter. Of course the British 
can negotiate to their hearts content with Nationalists of every 
hue, but in the absence of across-the-board Unionist participation, 
the whole process would have an air of Alice-in-Wonderland. 
The British Government made the decommissioning of arrp.s a 
stumbling block to progress. Ultimately, it is up to the government 
to undo the problem. In South Africa, when the National Party 
government tried to make the decommissioning of arms a precondition 
for African National Congress (ANC) participation in formal 
negotiations, the two sides got together and worked the problem 
out. The deliberations of their joint decommissioning committee did 
not, however, get in the way of substantive political negotiations. 
The rest, as they say, is history. 
The fact is that the decommissioning of arms in a situation of 
conflict is a byproduct of negotiations rather than a precondition 
for negotiations; it is an outcome rather than an enabler of the 
process; it is a consequence of establishing a climate of trust 
rather than a precursor for trust; it is contingent on the 
evolution of an agreed-upon political framework rather than 
something that emerges out of a political vacuum. 
In Northern Ireland the results of the political impasse on 
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the question of decommissioning began to unravel what had always 
been a tenuous peace-process. During the summer and fall of 1995, 
there was a steady drift into confrontations between Protestants 
and Catholics, increasingly ugly, increasingly inching their way 
towards violence, increasingly reminiscent of the sectarian 
confrontations of the late 1960s that were a prelude to the wider 
conflict. 
Fifteen months after the IRA declared a cease fire, Sinn Fein 
had little to show in terms of pol i tical gains , giving more 
credence in the movement to the arguments of the hard men, who had 
been only reluctantly persuaded to the merits of a cease fire, that 
the only thing on the British agenda is to smash the IRA. 
The IRA has faced this kind of predicament before when the 
contradictions of deeply-held posi tions led to splits in the 
movement between those who believe that the way forward is to join 
the constitutional process, despi te its deficiencies and 
disappointments, and those who believe that physical force is the 
only kind of diplomacy the British understand. Until late 1995, 
the former were having their way, but the latter were waiting in 
the wings. 
More ominously, talks between the British government and Sinn 
Fein had, for all intents and purposes, broken down, while the 
Irish government and the SDLP had not been able to find a formula 
for decommissioning, whether it involved an international mediation 
body or some other "neutral" institution, that would satisfy the 
British government and Sinn Fein. 
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Still more unsettling was Sinn Fein's failure in February 1996 
to sign the final report of the Forum on Peace and Reconciliation, 
because of its unwillingness to endorse the commission's 
recommendations in regard to the question of consent. 
The question of consent remains the bogeyman, exposing the 
essence of the irreconciliable elements of the conflict. No matter 
what language is used to obfuscate the issue, the parties to the 
conflict remain unconvinced of the good intentions of their 
protagionists. 
A ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
In January 1994, President Clinton, despi te the vociferous 
protestations of the British government approved a visa for Gerry 
Adams to enter the United States. Almost a year later, in December 
1994, in response to enormous and sustained pressure from Irish 
nationalist organizations, he appointed Senator George Mitchell, 
former President of the United States Senate as his Special Adviser 
on Northern Ireland. On March 16, 1995, he received Gerry Adams in 
the White House; in May 1995, he hosted a White House Conference on 
Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland, and in November 1995, he 
became the first US President to visit Northern Ireland, where he 
was received with exceptional warmth in both communities. 
If the United States is to play a constructive role in 
promoting the peace-process in Northern Ireland, it must be seen to 
be unerringly even-handed, by both communities in Northern Ireland. 
Otherwise the US, too, will, unwittingly and despite the best of 
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intentions, get sucked into the treacherous swamps of the 
province's tribal politics, perceived by Protestants as being one 
more ally of Catholic interests. 
While the British government likes to see itself as the 
"honest broker," in the peace process, and prides itself as having 
equal regard for the interests of both communities, it is a role it 
cannot play, despite its numerous and often plaintive protestations 
to the contrary, since it, too, is seen by both the Catholic and 
Protestant communities as being part of the problem. 
It is in this regard that the United States can carve a n>iche 
for itself, but only if it understands the rules of the game and 
has a clear understanding of what negotiations might lead to, and 
what they cannot lead to. 
WHAT IS THE PEACE PROCESS? 
The peace-process is not about Irish unification. Indeed, the 
question of Irish unification will not be on the negotiating 
agenda, not because Unionists are setting pre-conditions for 
negotiations, but because the question doesn't fall within the 
parameters of the multi-party talks that were scheduled to begin 
on June 10, 1996. 
Both the Irish and British governments have irrevocably committed 
themselves to one principle: that the unity of Ireland can only 
come about when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland give 
their consent in a free and fair referendum to such a change in 
their political status. This principle is embodied in the Anglo-
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Irish Agreement (1985), which was lodged with the United Nations 
and is internationally binding; again in the Downing Street 
Declaration (1993), and the subsequent Framework Document (1994) 
in which the two governments set out their suggestions as to the 
way forward. In addition, the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP), which speaks for at least two-thirds of the Catholics of 
Northern Ireland are equally committed to the principle of 
freely-given consent. There is unanimity of agreement that 
consent for a united Ireland does not exist at present nor for 
the foreseeable future. 
Unionists have a right, therefore, to demand an unequivoc~ 
declaration from Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, that 
it fully subscribes to this over-riding principle, which provides 
the context in which future talks will take place. If Sinn Fein 
refuses to give such an undertaking, then Unionists have a right 
to boycott multi-lateral talks, since their participation under 
these circumstances would suggest that they had somehow 
acquiesced on the principle of consent. 
This declaration from Sinn Fein on the primacy of consent within 
Northern Ireland as a precondition for the unification of Ireland 
is far more important than the interminable arguments over the 
decommissioning of arms by the IRA. If the Unionists and the 
British government are serious about finding a way to handle the 
decommissioning of arms, they have only to look at the way in 
which the question has been handled in other conflict-areas of 
the world. The key word is compromise -- a concept Unionists 
still have problems understanding, but in the absence of which, 
there can be no progress. 
78 
Given the iron-clad guarantee the Unionists have with regard to 
their constitutional position, the fact that the IRA cease fire 
has held and that Sinn Fein has entered the arena of 
constitutional politics, the UUP, in particular, must ultimately 
convince its constituency that it has to start making the 
compromises that will secure the peace. 
THE MITCHELL COMMISSION 
When the IRA declared a cease fire, it seemed that the last 
hurdle to peace talks involving all the parties to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland had been successfully overcome and that peace 
talks would finally get under way. 
But like most things involving Northern Ireland, matters were 
not quite that simple, and the process slid ineluctably into 
stalemate over the question of the decommissioning of arms. 
On November 28, 1995, days before President Clinton's visit to 
Northern Ireland, the Irish and British governments established an 
International Body, chaired by George Mitchell, the president's 
special envoy to Northern Ireland. 
The commission was charged with the task of coming up with a 
set of recommendations that would break the impasse on 
decommissioning and open the way for multi-party talks to proceed. 
The commission issued its report on January 24, 1996. It 
called on all parties to commit themselves to six principles which, 
the commission felt, would, if adhered to, lead to an honorable 
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peace. 
These principles called for a commi tment on all sides to: 
democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political 
issues; the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations; 
the renunciation of the use of force to influence the outcome of 
negotiations; reliance only on peaceful means in trying to alter 
any aspect of an outcome with which they might disagree; and an end 
to "punishment" beatings. 
On the questioning of decommissioning, the commission noted 
the irreconcilable di fferences among the parties involved, and 
suggested a compromise: that decommissioning take place in tandem 
with talks. 
In response, British Prime Minister John Major said in the 
House of Commons that in the absence of some decommissioning of 
arms by the IRA prior to multi-party negotiations, he would call 
for some form of an elected assembly in Northern Ireland which 
would be used to work out the modalities of negotiation. All 
parties, including Sinn Fein, would be entitled to participate in 
this assembly, according to their electoral mandates. Mr. Major's 
proposal was backed by Tony Blair, leader of the opposition Labour 
party and by Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democrats - both 
parties endorse the idea of an united Ireland. 
On the Nationalist side all hell broke loose. Major was 
accused of everything from deceiving the Irish government, which 
Major had failed to consul t before he had gone public, as the 
protocols of the Anglo-Irish Agreement called for; of cynically 
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aligning himself to the Ulster Unionists, who had put forward the 
idea of an election in the first place, in order to bolster his 
wafer thin majority in parliament; to endorsing a return to old-
time "stormont Rule" under which the Unionist majority had ruled 
(misruled) Northern Ireland for fifty years; to betraying 
Nationalist aspirations and siding wi th the proponents of an 
internal solution; and even of trying to destroy the fragile peace 
process to secure his own grip on power. 
There was no way, the Nationalist parties ( John Hurne's SDLP 
and Gerry Adams' Sinn Fein) furned that they would ever agree to an 
election. It was not, they were quick to point out, included among 
the recommendations of the Mitchell commission (even though the 
commission endorsed the idea, that "if it were broadly acceptable, 
with an appropriate mandate and within the three-strand structure, 
an elective process could contribute to the building of 
confidence") . 
And so things rested. The British maintained that in the 
absence of some decommissioning before talks, the Unionists would 
not participate, making talks meaningless. Hence, the only way, 
they argued, to get all the parties around the same table was to 
hold elections that would give a democratic mandate to all sides to 
participate in the resulting forum. 
Nationalists saw things in a starkly different light: in their 
view, the British, as always, were allowing Unionists to exercise 
a veto over the process. 
Even staunch Major supporters acknowledge that he mishandled 
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his response to the Mitchell report, leaving himself open to the 
accusations that were leveled at him, providing grounds for 
Nationalists, to believe that the Bri tish were up to their old 
tricks, past masters, as they were perceived to be, of the art of 
speaking out of both sides of their mouths and acting only on what 
appeared to be most expedient to their own narrow interests. 
Once again, the British failed to recognize the special 
sensitivities they must exercise in relation to Irish matters; once 
again they showed that they still had failed to learn the lessons 
of the historical past, even the recent past, and their failure to 
learn was seen in nationalist circles as a measure of their hubris; 
it became part of the inventory of grievance. 
The Mitchell commission, however, was careful not to append 
the words "we recommend" to its proposals on decommissioning. Its 
language is studiously neutral, the language of suggestion ("The 
parties should consider an approach ... that would represent a 
compromise"), not the language of judgement. In this context, the 
difference between its comments on decommissioning and an elective 
process was the difference between a "should" and a "COUld." 
In the following weeks, the White House became like a travel 
office. First off the mark was Michael Ancram, Minister of State 
For Northern Ireland who arrived in Washington DC to make the 
British case for elections; next came Gerry Adams, President of 
Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, to make the case against 
elections and for immediate all-party talks; next Dick Spring, the 
Irish Deputy-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to make 
the case for Dayton, Ohio-like "proximity talks." 
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Nationalist reaction had as much to do with the fact that the 
idea of an election to circumvent the IRA, 's unequivocal refusal to 
decommission was first mooted by David Trimble, leader of the 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) as with the merit or lack thereof of 
the proposal itself. In the zero-sum arithmetic of the Northern 
Ireland conflict, anything supported or proposed by Unionists is 
automatically rejected by Nationalists - and conversely. 
In a broader context, Nationalist reaction indicates that they 
continue to cling to the shibboleth that the British can exert some 
magic elixer-like influence on the Unionists, if only they chose 
to. The brouhaha over the election issue obscured one of the most 
important underlying and most frequently overlooked realities of 
the conflict: Unionist consent to the modalities of the negotiating 
process, not British government consent is what matters. The 
British can talk to Sinn Fein until the proverbial cows come home, 
but unless they bring the unionists along with them talks between 
the two can only yield peripheral dividends, not a permanent peace. 
For the better part of the last 30 years, Unionists have not 
regarded the British government as being the guardian of their 
interests. The marriage of the Union will continue, but if the 
Unionists were to ask for a divorce, the British government will 
not stand in their way. In short, there is more of a divergence 
than a convergence between British interests in Ireland and 
Unionist interests, a matter of increasing concern to Unionists, 
inclining them to march to the beat of their own drummer. 
Major's focus on an election as the only viable way forward 
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allowed Sinn Fein to grab the moral high-ground ("John Major has 
now adopted an entirely unionist agenda in an attempt to buy 
Unionist votes in Westminster." One wonders what Tony Blair and 
Paddy Ashdown were trying to buy.) 
As a result, Sinn Fein was able to make the political running, 
keeping its rhetoric skillfully focused on the charge that the 
Bri tish proposals for an election signaled nothing more than 
surrender to Unionist angst to return to the golden days of 
majority rule. 
In the barrage of charge and countercharge, Sinn Fein wa& not 
called on to declare i ts unequivocal support of the Mitchell's 
report six recommendations, which, if accepted by Sinn Fein, would 
put it in direct opposition to the IRA's adamant insistence that 
it will not entertain any suggestion of decommissioning, partial or 
otherwise, until it sees fit, in its own interests, to adopt an 
alternative course of action. 
Also overlooked in the raucous inspired by Major's 
miscalculated response to Mitchell were the caveats regarding an 
election that were either implicit in Mayor's statement in the 
Commons or have since been explicitly spelled out. 
An election boycotted by nationalists would be meaningless, 
and would be in that most English of phrases a "non-starter." All 
parties would have to participate, which means that all parties 
would have to agree on the purpose of the election, the remit of an 
elected assembly/forum, the length of time it would sit, the agenda 
it would address, the modalities of decision-making in terms of 
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sufficiency of consensus; the definition of consensus; the 
mechanisms to deal with crunch issues, and how to develop fall-back 
strategies to deal with situations when inevitable deadlocks 
threatened to derail the process. 
Such a forum would have no executive powers, no legislative 
powers, no administrative powers; its terms of reference would be 
confined solely to considerations of how to advance multiparty 
talks with the clear understanding among all parties that there 
could be a truly inclusive process, a necessary prerequisite for 
a lasting peace settlement, only if all the parties in Northern 
Ireland reach common ground on how to proceed. In this sense,.~ the 
two governments are, ironically, secondary players, enablers of 
facilitation rather than the prime movers. 
The decommissioning issue is, of course, as the Mitchell 
commission insightfully points out, symptomatic of a larger 
problem: the absence of trust. The postures that accompanied the 
report's release were a manifestation of that lack of trust. 
Accordingly, any forum that would bring the parties to the 
conflict together creates an ambience that, if properly cultivated, 
could be conducive to trust-building. There is a woeful lack of 
such mechanisms in place at the moment. 
Trust is a learned behavior .. When one community addresses the 
other lit must do so with particular sensi ti vi ty to the other 
community's politics. Parties must put themselves in the shoes of 
their protagonists. They must help their protagonists to bring 
their communities with them. In the end, successful negotiations 
are not so much about bringing your community along with you, as 
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helping your protagonists bring their communities along with them. 
Respect for the positions of the other, even in the face of 
disagreement, is germane to the whole process. 
Furthermore, the level of trust 
negotiators is an exponential function 
that develops among 
of their ability to 
communicate, which, in turn, requires them to invest in each other. 
An elected forum, a pre-negotiating marketplace for the exchange of 
ideas, as it were, would provide the political space in which the 
down-payments on future investments could be made. 
At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent risk 
of compromise; indeed, compromise is the essential ingredient of 
negotiations, without which there can be no progress. Each 
compromise is a building block, and as the parties grow to trust 
each other, they move from one compromise to the next, wi th 
concessions being made on all sides. Each side becomes invested in 
the process; each develops a stake in seeing the other succeed; a 
sum of mutual investments develops, which provides the cushion 
when it comes to the crunch issues. 
The Mitchell commission put it most succinctly: "Only resolute 
action by the parties themselves will produce results." 
BREAKDOWN 
In what came as an totally unexpected move, on February 9th, 
the IRA shocked the world, and threw the peace-process into seeming 
terminal disarray, with the announcement that its cease fire would 
end at 6:00 pm Irish time. 
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One hour later, 
killing two people, 
million in damages. 
a bomb exploded in London's Canary Warf 
injuring 43, and causing an estimated $300 
Minutes before the bomb went off, Gerry Adams, President of 
Sinn Fein rang the White House to inform the President's national 
security adviser, Anthony Lake "that he had some disturbing news." 
Consternation and the usual plethora of condemnations 
followed. A return to the violence-ridden days of 25 years seemed 
unthinkable after 18 months of peace during which the ordinary 
people of NI could walk the streets free of the threat of the 
random bullet or hidden bomb; during which many on both sides of 
the political/religious divide actually got to know each other and 
discovered that they shared a common longing for a lasting peace 
under whatever political arrangements might bring it to them. 
The conventional wisdom, or more correctly, the conventional 
wish, in the first few days following the bombing was that it might 
have been a "once-off", a signal by the IRA that the peace -process 
had to move at a quicker pace, a sign of intense displeasure with 
the British government's call for an election, seen in republican 
circles as one more stalling maneuver, and in this case an 
appalling one with its implicit suggestions of a return to 
"Stormont" rule. 
Official responses reflected the trenchant statements by both 
governments to get the peace-process back on rails as quickly as 
possible. 
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Among the preconditions sternly enumerated at one time or 






The IRA would have to declare a new cease fire. 
The cease fire would have to be a permanent cease fire. 
Sinn Fein would have to condemn the bombing at Canary Warf 
(not merely regret it). 
Sinn would have to disassociate itself from the IRA. 
The IRA would have to decommission its arms prior to all-
party talks. 
Both governments announced that until there was a new c~ase 
fire, neither would hold talks with Sinn Fein at ministerial 
level, although talks at other levels would still be possible. 
One problem facing both governments was how to assess where 
Sinn Fein stands in relation to the IRA. If, as Sinn Fein insists, 
it does not speak for the IRA (it draws almost theological 
distinctions between being in a position to speak to the IRA and 
being able to speak for the IRA; to having influence with the IRA 
and having control over the IRA), then this begs the question: What 
influence does Sinn Fein have with the IRA, and what can it deliver 
in all-party talks, since the widely-held assumption on all sides, 
never denied by Sinn Fein when it has been convenient not to do so, 
was that Sinn Fein did speak for the IRA. This was the reason for 
"wooing" Sinn Fein into the process in the first place. 
Indeed, John Major has gone so far as to say that the two 
organizations are interchangeable in their leadership structures 
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and Tories routinely refer to Sinn Fein/IRA, to reinforce their 
contention that both organizations are one and the same. (The Irish 
government holds a not dissimilar view, but without the 
ingenuousness the informs the British assessment.) 
On the one hand, neither government could decide whether to 
feed Gerry Adams to the republican hounds baying at his heels; on 
the other hand, they cannot decide whether he is still their best 
bet in reaching the IRA and having an influence on it. To further 
complicate matters, both governments still regard him as the most 
reasonable, able, and sophisticated of the Sinn Fein leaders in the 
dancing chorus. And there seems no one on the horizon who seems 
capable of replacing him. 
But if not Adams, then who? How do you keep the line of 
communication open with the IRA open? And with whom? 
How do you maintain connection, what backtrack channels do you 
construct when the men calling the shots, both li terally and 
figuratively, are faceless and guard their facelessness with the 
diligence of the possessed? 
Ironically, the decision of both governments to rule out 
meetings at ministerial level with Adams and his team (although 
sub~ministerial contacts are being maintained) weakened Adams at 
the very time when he needed to be strengthened. 
The two governments' decision diminished Adams' clout with the 
IRA, or whatever residual clout he had left, just when he had most 
need to show the IRA that he still has some real clout with London 
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and Dublin. 
A fundamental miscalculation in the analysis of both 
governments has been their belief that Adams could carry the IRA 
with him. Hence the British thought he could carry the IRA with 
him on decommissioning, despite the IRA making it clear that 
decommissioning of arms prior to all-party talks would be 
tantamount to an admission of surrender and was simply not oni and 
Dublin believed that he could carry the IRA with him on the 
question of consent (that the consent of a majority of the people 
of Northern Ireland is necessary before a change in the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland can take place.) Both 
proved to be ill-founded illusions. 
Inherent to the problem is that the peace-process itself as 
ini tially designed and executed was fatally flawed, al though to 
point that out in the euphoria that accompanied the first peace in 
Northern Ireland in nearly 30 years left one open to the accusation 
of being a doomsayer, even of being somehow opposed to the peace 
process itself. The doubting Thomases kept their heads down and 
their doubts to themselves. 
The cease fire was a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for peace. All parties held tenaciously to their belief in its 
self-generating sustainability, even when the political circles to 
be squared became political circles to be cubed. 
While it is easy to put the blame for the breakdown on the 
impasse over decommissioning of arms and the British government's 
rejection of the Mitchell commission's suggestion regarding 
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decommissioning and talks in tandem although how Mitchell 
envisaged bringing the Unionist parties into the negotiating tent 
is another matter), the cold reality is that the origins of the 
breakdown were embedded in the premises upon which the peace 
process itself was built, premises based on false expectations 
emerging out of the belief that some agreed end to the conflict 
would emerge, if only the guns were silenced. 
On February 18, 1996 Sinn Fein gave its response to the 
demands being made upon it. In a speech at Conway Mill, Adams set 
out the basis for a recommencement of negotiations: 
Any new process [he said] must contain copper fastened and 
unambiguous public assurances that all-party talks will be 
initiated by both governments at the earliest possible date, 
they [must] proceed with urgency and within an agreed time 
frame upon an inclusive agenda, and without any preconditions 
whatsoever. A peace process is a means to an end. The end is 
a negotiated settlement - an agreed peace settlement. That 
requires change. Sinn Fein have argued that change is 
required in three main areas. There is a need for political 
and constitutional change. There is a need also for a 
democraticization and demilitarization of the 
situation .. Because republicans are committed to a total end to 
British rule in Ireland, we have an acute sense of what the 
breakdown of the peace process means. 
No mention of cease fires; no mentioning of decommissioning. 
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Indeed, if one were to identify the one obstacle to any kind 
of progress to try and put the shattered pieces of the peace -
process back together, that obstacle is endemic lack of trust. 
As things stood, no one knew how to put the pieces back 
together. Poorly conceived chess games invariably lead to 
stalemate. What remained to be seen was how the Loyalist 
paramilitaries would respond. Whether, in the event of further 
bombings in mainland British cities, they would resort to targets 
in Dublin and other cities in the Republic, or whether they would 
wait for the IRA to breach the cease fire in the North. If the 
latter were to take place, it would herald a return to the days of 
escalating sectarian killings, and unfortunately, perhaps that's 
the way it may yet have to bei that things will have to get a lot 
worse before they get better. But for the time being, the Loyalists 
have held their fire. And the IRA has studiously avoided taking 
its campaign to the North. 
WHAT WENT WRONG? 
** Both the British government and Sinn Fein regarded each 
other as being responsible for bringing the cease fire about. (John 
Major: "the IRA came to us and said 'the conflict is over, help us 
move the process forward.' Gerry Adams: '[we] John Hume and I, 
along with Albert Reynolds and elements of Irish America persuaded 
the IRA to call a complete cessation of violence ... ') 
In real i ty, the cease fire was 
directly among the parties involved. 
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brokered, not negotiated 
Thus both sides came out of 
the cease fire bargaining with different understandings of what the 
cease fire involved. 
** The British believed that Adams et al spoke authoritatively 
on behalf of the IRA. The IRA thought the British could bring the 
Unionists to the table,if only they had the will to do. Both were 
incorrect. In terms of time-frames both sides were working to the 
ticking of different clocks, and therefore often at cross-purposes. 
** For the British, the peace process would, by its nature be 
long drawn-out, necessarily bureaucratic: the mandarins of 
Whitehall had to have their time to ply the wiles of their trade. 
For Sinn Fein, the peace process was a matter of extreme urgency: 
the IRA had put them under time constraints to deliver. 
** Both sides made tactical decisions that delayed the 
process. The IRA would not give an undertaking that the cease fire 
was permanent note the difference between "complete" and 
"permanent") Sinn Fein were under the impression that all-party 
talks would take place within three months of the declaration of 
the cease fire, without further modalities having to be worked out. 
For the British, there continued to be the question of how to bring 
the Unionists to the table. The IRA never sufficiently appreciated 
that what mattered was getting Unionist consent to talks, 
British consent. Hence the issue of decommissioning 





** The IRA's commitment to non-violence was continually 
questioned in view of punishment shootings it routinely carried out 
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transported the bomb was stolen in Larne three weeks before the 
Canary Wharf bombing, as were the tax disc and new licence plates. 
It was ferried to Strandlyre in Scotland and driven South. This was 
not just a knee-j erk response to the Bri tish reaction to the 
Mitchell Report; the British response merely allowed for moving up 
the date to capitalize on a situation where they could say "the 
Brits made us do it." 
** There is a convenient propensity for amnesia to set 
regarding the unchanging hallmarks of Irish Republicanism when 
peace might seem to be in the offing: 
** only physical force will work; physical force is the Dnly 






total distrust of the political process 
the British as always out to divide and conquer; that they 
stall as a matter of strategy to a sap the will of their 
opponents and create divisions among them as they attempt 
to assess what it is the British are really up to. 
a guarantee of British withdrawal is a necessary 
prerequisite to a cease fire 
the Army Council reigns supreme 
the southern establishment has 
purposes sold out 
for all intents and 
** The British and Irish governments, and the SDLP were under 
the impression that Sinn Fein had accepted the doctrine of consent. 
Sinn Fein had not, or even if it had made tentative moves in that 
direction in 1994/'95, those moves were not moot in light of its 
failure to sign the final report of the commission on peace and 
reconciliation, and the reinstatement in Adams' speech on February 
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15 that the aim of the movement was to end, once and for all, 
British rule in Ireland. 
** The failure on the part of both governments to understand 
that what the republican movement feared most of all was a split, 
because of the catastrophic impact of splits on the movement in the 
past; and that when it came to a split or the doves having to go 
along reluctantly with the hawks, the doves went along in the 
interests of unity - and because they are disciplined members of 
the movement, for the most part tempered and trained by many years 
in jail for their beliefs. 
THE WAY FORWARD 
There are many who would argue that the recent IRA bombings in 
London achieved their tactical goal, forcing the British and Irish 
governments to set a date for multi-party talks and bringing to an 
end the stalemate that had bogged down the peace process in 
Northern Ireland for the last eighteen months. 
Although both governments have agreed to a complicated mish 
mash of measures including Bosnia-style proximity talks, elections 
for an forum which will select members of negotiating teams, and a 
date for the start of all-party talks, these measures were cobbled 
together in response to the desperate attempt by the two 
governments to keep the process alive at almost any cost. Of most 
significance, however, is the fact that they have not induced the 
IRA to reinstate its ceasefire. Indeed, the IRA has rejected the 
Anglo-Irish attempt to revive the process as "inadequate," 
reafirmmed that "under no circumstances" would it decommission its 
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in West Belfast, heightening Unionist insistence on decommissioning 
prior to talks. For the IRA punishment beatings and the like were 
a way of letting the British know it had not simply folded its tent 
and lacked the will to go on. Both sides misread the signals of 
the other. 
* * For over a year, the British made decommissioning the 
primary condition for progress, while they should have known that 
decommissioning prior to all-party talks was simply not on That 
it would simply be an admission of surrender by the IRA. 
** And this is the crux of the failure of both the British and 
the IRA to understand the imperatives that were the driving forces 
behind the decisions of both: On the British side the failure to 
understand how Irish Republicanism works and what drives it. That 
Sinn Fein is subordinate to the army council; that the decision to 
agree to a cease fire was opposed by perhaps 30% of council 
members; that the hard liners were waiting in the wings should the 
Adams strategy fail; that recent changes in the personnel on the 
army council indicated a waning of the influence of the 
Adams/McGuinness faction of support. That the Adams/McGuinness axis 
of support on the army council lost control of the council. 
McGuinness was replaced. Hard liners took over. In their view, Sinn 
Fein had nothing to show for its political initiative. 
It was back to basics. The gun worked. It was the only thing 
the British understood. 
** In the view of most of those close to the IRA, the end of 
the cease fire was planned for the end of February. The lorry that 
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armory until there was a "final negotiated settlement" to the 
conflict, and dismissed out-of-hand the calls for a new ceasefire. 
And even if a new ceasefire did somehow materialize, it would not 
bring real peace -- peace that is the product of a durable and 
lasting political settlement. 
In short, to say the IRA has bombed its way to the negotiating 
table or has lit a metaphorical fuse under the peace process would 
be to simplify the conflict to the point of willful distortion. At 
the moment there is nothing the IRA can bomb its way to. 
In Northern Ireland, Yeats' terrible beauties have an almost 
quixotic penchant for becoming terrible mistakes, parasites that 
feed on each other with an insatiable appetite to capture what has 
never existed in the cause of a dream that has brought only 
nightmare, in the name of an aspiration few ascribe to but none 
will renounce. 
Irredentist Irish Nationalism had gone back to its roots. 
"Brits Out," and if it takes the death of some poor Bengali blown 
to rubble in the explosion at Canary Wharf to advance the cause of 
a united Ireland, so be it. For the hard liners who had seized 
control of the IRA's Army Council, the cease fire was simply war by 
other means, and when it failed to deliver a place for Sinn Fein at 
all-party talks without the IRA having to commit itself to a series 
of unacceptable conditions, its utility was over. And, no doubt, 
if in time a restoration of a ceasefire better serves their 
purposes, they will as easily opt for that route. 
Meanwhile, what remains of the peace process continues to 
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disintegrate in the face of what amounts to virtual paralysis in 
the corridors of power in London and Dublin, and the sense of the 
lack of trust among the key players on all sides - even on the same 
side - is palpable. 
Indeed, if one were to identify the one obstacle to any kind 
of progress to try and put the shattered pieces of the peace -
process back together, that obstacle is endemic lack of trust. 
Finger-pointing is in vogue, whispers of who is to blame for what 
abound, even as the whisperers themselves admit to the 
pointlessness of the practice. Political shadow-boxing, where the 
clever feint, counts as a substantial punch, usurps the place of 
honest dialogue. 
But there are ways forward. 
** Take Sinn Fein at its word. If it does not speak for the 
IRA, uncouple the two. In that case, arrange for direct talks 
between the British and the IRA to resolve the question of 
decommissioning. The late president of Israel, Yizhak Rabin said: 
"You do not make peace with your friends but with your enemies." 
Rabin understood the risk implicit in that course of action, and in 
the end he paid for that belief with his life. In Northern Ireland 
the time has come for the risk-takers to sieze hold of the peace 
process. 
There must be enemy-to-enemy head-on negotiations on a 
bilateral basis. That means Britain and the IRA no 
intermediaries. Only they can make the deals regarding 
decommissioning, related security matters and the release of 
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prisoners that will last. 
** Set-up an open-ended negotiating forum, beginning with the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) , the Alliance Party and the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP). Any party that is invited to participate would have to meet 
certain criteria; all parties would be free to abstain or join at 
whatever point they wished to, provided they met the participating 
criteria. 
** The key criteria for participation in the forum should be 
a party's acceptance of the Mitchell principles. 
** The Irish government, British government, SDLP, the 
Unionists parties, the Alliance Party, in fact all parties, with 
the exception of Sinn Fein have said they accept and will honor 
these principles. This unusual unanimity among the parties 
representing at least 85 per cent of the electorate in Northern 
Ireland must be built on; it represents the nearest thing to common 
ground that all the constitutional parties have agreed to since 
1969 and would enjoy the support of the vast majority of the people 
on every side of the political/religious divide. 
** Sinn Fein would have two choices: Freed from supposedly 
having to speak for the IRA, it could subscribe to the Mitchell 
principles and join the forum, leaving it up to the IRA to hammer 
out its own accommodations wi th the British government. Or it 
could opt to stay out of the process by not subscribing to 
Mitchell, await the outcome of the British/IRA talks, thus leaving 
the question of joining the forum open. 
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Either way the negotiating train would leave the station, and 
as long as the center (SDLP and UUPl stayed aboard, the others 
could either come along for the ride, or risk marginalizing 
themselves. 
Above all, begin. Allowing a vacuum to develop on the 
political front will simply ensure that violence will inevitably 
follow. 
BUILDING A FRAMEWORK 
As regards constitutional models, possibilities are profuse, 
ranging from resuscitation of the old Stormont majority rule, to 
various power-sharing recipes with or without an Irish Dimension, 
to forms of an all-Ireland federation or confederation, some 
ingeniously designed, to models that would place Northern Ireland 
in the context of Europe, calls for independence, or at least 
autonomy, models of consociation, joint authority, and 
cantonisation. 
A review of the extensive literature on Northern Ireland would 
put particular emphasis on the following as essential 
considerations that will have to frame any future settlement: 
• An almost universal acceptance in the Protestant community 
that power will have to be shared with Catholics. 
• An acknowledgment that an Irish Dimension exists which 
must be accommodated but an absolute refusal on the part 
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of Protestants to agree to any arrangement that would give 
the Republic an executive role in the government of 
Northern Ireland. 
• Widespread disagreement on the form that relationship 
should take, varying from the "good neighbors" formulation 
and "cooperation on matters of mutual concern" variations 
to a relationship that would give the Republic an 
executive role in the government of Northern Ireland. 
• Explicit recognition of the fact that the future of the 
economies of the two parts of Ireland are inextricably 
linked to a Single Market Europe. 
• Widespread agreement that Northern Ireland should be as 
self-governing as possible. 
• A majority rule, whether simple or proportionate, is not 
a viable proposition; the nationalist communi ty has no 
obligation to agree to it and has the critical mass to 
prevent its imposition; 
• The Unionist community will not accept an administration 
for Northern Ireland that gives an executive role to 
anyone from outside the U.K. 
• A Bill of Rights is almost universally endorsed as being 
a desirable part of any settlement. 
• Proportionate power sharing. 
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• Equal power sharing to give literal expression to the 
equality of the two traditions. 
• No accommodation can work as long as one community 
continues to police the other. 
• If there is to be lasting peace in Ireland, ways must be 
found to bring Sinn Fein/IRA and the Loyalist 
paramilitaries into the process. 
• Special majorities 
legislation. 
required to secure passage of 
• Various mechanisms to give veto rights to the minori ty 
with regard to matters of particular concern to it. 
• An acknowledgment that the structure of the Anglo- Irish 
Agreement signed by London and Dublin in November, 1985 











nationalists and the British government is neutral, who 
represents the interests of the Unionists? To the extent 
that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is deficient in this 
regard, it adds to the democratic deficit and is a 
legitimate source of guidance in the Unionist 
community. 
In Northern Ireland, as currently constituted, notions that 
may be discarded are that: 
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• Northern Ireland is like any other part of the U.K.; 
• The Northern Ireland communities will agree on Northern 
Ireland independence; 
• The U. K. will quit Northern Ireland under pressure of 
violence; 
• The Irish Republic will renounce the aim of Irish unity; 
• Irish unity is a realistic prospect in the foreseeable 
future. 
Ultimately, the question is how to establish a basis of trust 
between the two communities, especially when the two communities 
become more segregated. There is a need for some interactive 
process that will enable each community to "learn" the language and 
mode of thinking of the other. This is especially true in relation 
to the Protestant community which is highly distrustful of the 
Catholics' "hidden agenda": to somehow deceive them into becoming 
part of a united Ireland. 
Trust is, of course, related to uncertainty, especially uncertainty 
over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and hence the 
need for some mechanism to make that status a non-issue. If 
political consensus is to emerge, then mutual trust and respect, 
tolerance of others, and a willingness to compromise must exist at 
all levels of society within Northern Ireland. 
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NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES 
1) There should be transparency in the negotiating 
process, openness and the uncamouflaged. The people 
of Ireland should be made part of the process, so that 
when obstacles emerge, and they will, they can be discussed 
and clarified in the public domain. On no account, should an 
impression be conveyed that deals are being done behind closed 
doors. 
2) Catholic negotiators most eschew the fanciful 
footwork, and recognize that the Protestant propensity 
for theinductive is an inherent part of their tradition, 
and must be accepted and respected in that context. 
3) Every party must recognize, as must both governments, 
that different communities use language in different 
ways, and that structures should be put in place that 
anticipate and defuse the misunderstandings that will 
arise because of these differences. 
4) Progress only comes when negotiating parties learn to 
start trusting each other. Trust is earned. When one 
community addresses the other, it must do so with 
particular sensitivity to the other community's politics. 
Parties must themselves in the shoes of their 
protagonists. They must help their protagonists to bring 
their communities with them. In the end, successful 
negotiations are not so much about bringing your 
community along with you, as helping your protagonists 
bring their communities along with them. Respect for the 
others' positions is germane to the whole process. 
5) The level of trust that develops among negotiators is 
a function of their ability to communicate, which, in 
turn, requires them to develop a common vocabulary. 
6) If political consensus is to emerge, then mutual trust 
and respect, tolerance of others, and a willingness to 
compromise must exist at all levels in Northern Ireland. 
In this regard, where there is a transparent absence of 
trust on each side of the divide, due in part to 
ingrained cultural differences with regard to language 
and process - some of which have their origins in 
religious structures and competing claims to legitimacy 
that developed over the centuries - a negotiating process 
that stipulates that "nothing is agreed until everything 
is agreed" sets up a situation more like a poker table 
than a negotiating table. 
7) The formula that "nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed," discourages openness and risk-taking, and 
encourages every side to play their cards close to their 
chests, making it difficult to create the ambience in 
which accommodation emerges. 
8) At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent 
risk of compromise; indeed, compromise is the essential 
ingredient of negotiations, without which there can be no 
negotiations. Each compromise is a building block, and 
as the parties grow to trust each other, the move from 
one compromise to the next, with concessions, though 
difficult, being made on all sides. Each side becomes 
invested in the process, each develops a stake in seeing 
the other succeed, a sum of mutual investments develops, 
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